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INTRODUCTION 
There were promises made across this desk!  You mustn’t tell me 
you’ve got people to see—I put thirty-four years into this firm . . . 
and now I can’t pay my insurance!  You can’t eat the orange and 
throw the peel away—a man is not a piece of fruit!1 
he United States has some of the most relaxed employment 
protections in the world.2  The American employment regime is 
centered on the long-standing employment-at-will doctrine, which 
allows employers to discharge employees at any time and for any 
 
1 ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 82 (Penguin Books 1976).  Willy Loman’s 
argument did not succeed, and he was fired anyway.  See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 
F.2d 1202, 1205 n.6 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing a portion of the same).  The court’s application 
of Willy Loman’s language in Metz suffered a similar fate as Arthur Miller’s now-famous 
protagonist.  See also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (noting that Metz had been subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court in 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993)). 
2 E.g., Donald C. Dowling, Jr., U.S.-Based Multinational Employers and the “Social 
Contract” Outside the United States, 43 INT’L LAW. 1237, 1239–47 (2009) (detailing the 
lack of employment protections for U.S. workers relative to their global counterparts). 
T
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reason.3  No notice is required.  Even absurd rationales, such as left-
handedness, are permissible grounds for discharge.  Although a 
number of exceptions exist, the core principle enabling broad freedom 
to discharge remains firmly intact.4  All fifty states adhere to the 
employment-at-will principle in some form, and exhortations to 
overthrow the regime altogether have been unsuccessful.5 
Voluminous scholarship exists evaluating the propriety and 
effectiveness of the employment-at-will doctrine.  The doctrine has 
produced a deep secondary literature displaying a full spectrum of 
arguments and theories ranging from those advocating a complete 
overthrow of the doctrine to others advocating strict enforcement 
without exception.6  Numerous books are dedicated to explaining the 
law on the subject,7 with one forthcoming tome an estimated nine 
hundred pages long.8  The debate over employment at will shows no 
 
3 The employment-at-will doctrine has a long history in American law.  See generally 
Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 118 (1976) (providing an overview of the employment-at-will relationship). 
4 Even though employment at will remains the core principle in American employment 
law, a number of exceptions have developed to the doctrine.  Unfortunately, the exceptions 
are not universally adopted in the fifty states.  In addition, the application of the exceptions 
has created a chaotic jurisprudence.  The result is that an employee’s success in bringing a 
wrongful discharge case often depends more on the state in which she brings the lawsuit 
than upon the facts of the case.  Alternatively stated, identical cases brought in two 
different states’ legal systems often result in different outcomes.  See Scott A. Moss, 
Where There’s At-Will, There are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of 
Employment at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 301 (2005) (“Interestingly, there is little 
consistency in the case law limiting employment at will.  States haphazardly adopt some 
proposed exceptions while rejecting others that similarly limit employers' at-will 
discretion.”). 
5 See, e.g., Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of “Just Cause” in 
Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594; David Dominguez, Just Cause 
Protection: Will the Demise of Employment at Will Breathe New Life into Collective Job 
Security?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 283 (1992); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and 
Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1443 (1996); Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New 
York, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137 (1989).  But see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the 
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984). 
6 Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 517, 517 & n.1 (2004) (revealing approximately 230 law review articles published 
over a nearly eighteen-year period in an online search).  The result was obtained by 
searching for “‘at will’ and some derivative of the word ‘employment’ in the[] title” using 
the Westlaw legal research database.  Id. at 517 n.1. 
7 E.g., DANIEL MURNANE MACKEY, EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND EMPLOYER 
LIABILITY (1986); LIONEL J. POSTIC, WRONGFUL TERMINATION: A STATE-BY-STATE 
SURVEY (1994). 
8 See EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Melinda J. Caterine ed., 
forthcoming 2011); see also BNA BOOKS: LEGAL PUBLICATIONS CATALOG 2011–2012, 
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signs of slowing, as scholars apply its dictates to emerging 
technologies and propose new ways to alleviate the sting of this harsh 
workplace doctrine.9 
While this debate continues, very little empirical legal research 
examines the perception of the most important constituent in the 
discharge process: the employees themselves who risk arbitrary and 
immediate termination.  Employees do not approach involuntary 
separation from their employers with the cold detachment that legal 
rules convey.  A loss of one’s employment to unfortunate but 
uncontrollable conditions, such as a declining economy or a lack of 
work, is devastating.  Losing a job because of perceived unfair 
treatment, such as a false accusation of incompetence or company 
politics, by an indifferent employer, can provoke deep-seated anger 
and resentment. 
While employers can, and regularly do, terminate workers without 
cause, notice, or reason, that does not necessarily mean that such legal 
discharges occur without a price.  Employees do not leave without 
complaint, nor do they pursue redress only when the law stands in 
their favor.  Rather, the attitudes of employees toward discharge, and 
their reactions to being discharged, originate from a complex set of 
beliefs and attitudes that do not necessarily conform to legal rules.10  
Frivolous litigation, negative publicity, low morale, and increased 
stress can all arise from the retaliatory actions of discharged 
employees with a resultant decrease in productivity in the existing 
work force. 
Some of these employee reactions are beyond the employer’s 
control.  However, terminated employees may respond differently 
according to their beliefs regarding the malevolence of others, their 
inclination toward anger in everyday life, and their level of personal 
 
http://www.bna.com/uploadedfiles/Content/Products/Books/catalog.pdf (last visited Oct. 
12, 2011). 
9 E.g., Stephen D. Lichtenstein & Jonathan J. Darrow, At-Will Employment: A Right to 
Blog or a Right to Terminate?, 11 J. INTERNET LAW 1 (2008); Nicole B. Porter, The 
Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause, 87 
NEB. L. REV. 62 (2008); Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling the World Wide Weblog: A 
Proposal for Blogging, Employment-at-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes, 42 
VAL. U. L. REV. 245 (2007). 
10 Professor Moss notes that “scholarship supports an argument that informal social 
norms and free-market incentives adequately deter unjust terminations, rendering 
employment litigation unnecessary.”  Moss, supra note 4, at 342.  But the argument can 
also be used to support the claim that these norms and incentives are just as likely to raise 
employee expectations of a just-cause termination right. 
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anxiety.11  Yet, some of the most important antecedents of negative 
employee behavior—the propriety of the discharge and 
accompanying termination procedures—are fully within the 
employer’s control.  If employers can better understand how the 
conditions and rationales of discharge impact the affected employee, 
employers can avoid needless legal disputes and employees would 
experience less frustration from perceived inequitable treatment.  
While most scholarship examines the permissibility of discharge, this 
Article uncovers the perception of discharge and its powerful impact 
on litigation, retaliation, or other actions taken against employers. 
Instead of merely speculating on this point, in this Article we 
report the results of an empirical survey aimed at measuring the 
reactions of individuals to various employment discharge scenarios.  
The results of this survey offer striking insights into the workers’ 
perceptions of discharge under a variety of foreseeable conditions. 
Part I of this Article examines the evolving law of employment 
discharge.  This part highlights the long history and development of 
the modern rule.  Far from being a construction of judicial fiat, 
employment at will took hold in the United States as a result of a 
number of social and economic developments that impacted 
employment relations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Part II introduces the concept of the psychological contract, a 
bundle of expectations an employee possesses about the mutual 
obligations extant between the employee and the employer.  The 
psychological contract, a construct commonly used in human resource 
literature, offers explanatory power in that it helps explain the 
antecedents and outcomes of employment termination.  In this Part 
we show that breach of psychological contracts by employers can 
have a meaningful effect on the attitudes of employees toward their 
employer. 
Part III provides the data and rationale for the empirical survey of 
employment termination presented in this Article.  The respondents in 
the survey were provided one of twelve discharge scenarios involving 
issues of procedural and substantive justice.12  In some of the 
scenarios, the participants were provided degrees of information as to 
 
11 See, e.g., Robert Eisenberger et al., Who Takes the Most Revenge? Individual 
Differences in Negative Reciprocity Norm Endorsement, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 787 (2004) (studying the impact of these and other variables on revenge 
behavior). 
12 See infra Appendix A. 
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the state of the existing law of employment discharge.13  Respondents 
were then questioned on their attitudes toward the company and their 
willingness to seek legal redress.14  Part III then reports our findings.  
The study found that while substantive and procedural fairness in 
isolation improve employee attitudes, having both a fair reason and a 
fair process for discharge considerably amplifies these positive 
attitudes.  We also reach the conclusion, among others, that 
propensity to sue correlates with the legal knowledge of employees 
regarding their rights or lack thereof.  This Article concludes that 
employers have a significant influence over whether former 
employees take legal action or retaliate against the firm. 
Part IV examines the role of norms in affecting perceptions, 
generating expectations, and in the decision to resort to legal action.  
It proposes that the psychological contract can best be understood as a 
basket of norms.  It notes the role of norms in the law-creation 
process.  This Part also examines the relational norms that form the 
basis of relational contract theory and the psychological contract.  In 
the end, it notes, based upon the findings of the study, that feelings of 
injustice (violation of the fairness norm) is the pervasive factor in 
determining the outcome of employment termination.  It also analyzes 
the relationship between knowledge and perceptions, namely, the 
issue of whether greater employee knowledge of the employment-at-
will doctrine affects the employee’s perception of the employment 
relationship. 
Part V builds on the analysis of the previous Parts to advance ways 
in which employers can utilize the fairness norm to control 
employees’ expectations, preferences, and actions.  It suggests a 
number of “best practices” that help merge the internal 
(psychological) contract and the external (legal) contract to the benefit 
of both employer and employee.  Finally, Part VI examines ways in 
which employment law should be changed or applied in order to close 
the gap between the reasonable expectations of employees found in 
the psychological contract and the limited protections provided under 
a strict employment-at-will legal regime.  This Part also provides 
ideas for future research based on the findings of the study, 
recognizing certain issues not directly dealt with in the present study. 
 
13 Id. 
14 See infra Appendix B. 
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I 
THE EVOLVING LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGE 
The employment-at-will doctrine governs most non-unionized, 
private sector workers in the United States.  The doctrine is as simple 
as it is far reaching—an employer can terminate an employee for 
good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.15  Its origins date back to 
the English Statute of Labourers, enacted in 1562.16  The statute 
provided employees a special status within the contractual nature of 
the employment relationship.17  It provided numerous employee 
(apprentice) protections, including the requirement of notice and the 
rule that apprentices were only dischargeable for reasonable cause.18  
The rule then developed that any hiring for an unfixed duration was 
presumed to be for a year at a time.19 
The Industrial Revolution shifted the law-of-employment paradigm 
from status-based employee protections to the contract-based 
employment-at-will doctrine.20  Horace Wood, in A Treatise on the 
Law of Master and Servant, declared that employment at will was the 
law of the land.21  Accurate or not, Wood’s declaration of 
 
15 This concept has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate.  See supra notes 6–9 
and accompanying text. 
16 Statute of Labourers, 5 Eliz., c.4 (1562); see also Feinman, supra note 3, at 120. 
17 Id. 
18 IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD ET AL., WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: AN EMPLOYER’S PRACTICAL 
AND LEGAL GUIDE ON WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 16 (1989). 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  For a fuller analysis of the role status in contract has played in the development 
of the law, see Larry A. DiMatteo & Samuel Flaks, Beyond Rules, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 297 
(2010) (exploring Nathan Isaacs’s thesis that legal development is not one of linear 
progression, but one characterized by cycles between status-based and contract-based 
relationships). 
21 Wood’s statement on the issue is unequivocal: 
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a 
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is 
upon him to establish it by proof.  A hiring at so much a day, week, month or 
year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches 
that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party 
may serve. 
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT: COVERING THE 
RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES § 134, at 272 
(1877).  However, he could find only four cases to support this proposition.  Id. § 134, at 
272 n.4.  Scholars have questioned whether any of Wood’s cases supported his 
declaration.  See, e.g., J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to 
Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974).  But see Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. 
Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 552 
(1990) (“It is a factoid that Horace Wood spun the rule of at-will termination out of his 
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employment at will as the common law’s default rule helped to 
trigger the American legal system to discard the just-cause rule of 
termination.  In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down laws that regulated employer-
employee regulations due to the private contractual nature of the 
employment relationship.22  Although the Supreme Court eventually 
changed course to allow government regulation of the workplace, 
“Wood’s Rule” has remained the law of employment termination. 
Even though the termination-at-will principle has persisted, efforts 
have been made to limit its application to correct perceived injustices.  
The first recognized exception was the public policy exception.  In 
1959, a California court ruled that firing an employee for refusing to 
commit perjury constituted an improper violation of public policy.23  
The public policy exception prohibits firings for reasons that society 
has deemed to be against the public interest.  For example, 
termination due to missing work while serving on a jury or reporting 
illegal conduct to law enforcement is recognized as a violation of 
public policy.24  These more specific recognitions of public policy are 
used to preempt the more general policy of freedom of contract that 
underlies the employment-at-will rule. 
Scholarly criticism in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged courts to 
adopt more systematic exceptions to the rule.25  The result has been 
the recognition of two additional exceptions in some states—the 
implied-in-fact and implied-in-law exceptions.26  The implied-in-fact 
 
own woolgathering.  Wood's citations do support his proposition; it did not simply spring 
‘full-blown in 1877 from his busy and perhaps careless pen. . . .’” (original alteration 
omitted)); see also Feinman, supra note 3, at 125–27 (exploring Wood’s assertions in 
more depth). 
22 E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11 (1915) (“In all such particulars the employer 
and the employé have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an 
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify 
in a free land.”); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173–74 (1908). 
23 Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
24 Bird, supra note 6, at 542. 
25 E.g., Kurt H. Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania—A Proposal for Its 
Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 477 (1983); Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56 IND. L.J. 207 (1981); Donald 
H.J. Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Property Rights in One’s Job: The Case for Limiting 
Employment-at-Will, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 763 (1982); Philip J. Levine, Comment, Towards a 
Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1081 (1973). 
26 Robert C. Bird & Donald J. Smythe, The Structure of American Legal Institutions 
and the Diffusion of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 1978–1999, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 833, 
837 (2008); Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 MO. L. REV. 1233, 1243–
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contract exception grants rights to employees based upon 
representations made by an employer orally or in written materials 
such as employee handbooks, company policies, and representations 
made through electronic means.27  This exception grants employees 
protection based upon an implied but legally binding contract.  In 
some cases, despite the express designation by the employer that the 
employment is at will, courts have allowed evidence to show that an 
implied contract had been formed requiring notice or just cause for 
the termination.28  A number of courts have used the rationale that 
though the employment was at will at the time of commencement, 
employer representations, materials, and practices worked a 
modification to a just-cause employment contract.29 
The implied-in-law exception primarily looks at the motives of the 
employer.  It is more popularly referred to as the good-faith 
exception.  While the implied-in-fact exception focuses on the finding 
of an actual contract based upon the particular facts and context of the 
employment, the good-faith exception is based upon a general duty 
that all employers owe to their employees.30  The court reviews the 
 
44 (1992); Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks, Contract Formation and 
Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological, and Empirical Analyses, 29 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 647, 678–80 (1994); Julia Barnhart, Comment, The Implied-in-Fact Contract 
Exception to At-Will Employment: A Call for Reform, 45 UCLA L. REV. 817 (1998). 
27 E.g., Philip H. Dorff, Jr. & Hugh J. Cain, The Evolution of the Implied Contract 
Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Iowa: From Young to French and 
Beyond, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 359, 360 (1994); see also Tammy Harris, Case Note, Brodie v. 
General Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1997), 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 351 
(1998) (reviews the use of employee handbooks in implied-in-fact employment lawsuits). 
28 See Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) 
(longevity of employment is a factor in finding a just-cause contract); Toussaint v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 890–92 (Mich. 1980) (enforced terms in 
an employee handbook that policy of the company was discharge only for just cause); J. 
Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: 
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837.  See generally Robert S. 
Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith–Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) (advancing excluder analysis, noting that good faith cannot 
be defined, but bad faith is recognizable); Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General 
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 
195 (1968) (introducing the excluder analysis).  But see Steven J. Burton, More on Good 
Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 
(1984) (asserting that good faith can be conceptualized). 
29 E.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 97–98 (Conn. 
1995); Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445–
46 (N.Y. 1982). 
30 Good faith is a metaprinciple or what one scholar referred to as “transubstantive”; in 
other words, the principle occupies an entire area of law and is not context specific.  See 
Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?—Recent American 
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facts of the case to determine if there was a breach of this societal 
duty of good faith.31  However, as in other areas of the law where the 
good-faith concept is used, there is a definitional problem.  A 
longstanding debate in contract scholarship has centered on the 
problem of defining good faith.  One of the approaches starts from the 
premise that good faith is indefinable.32  It then suggests that even 
though good faith is indefinable, the law is able to recognize acts of 
bad faith.  Like obscenity, a judge knows bad faith when she sees it.  
Professor Summers’s works on the recognition of bad faith as the 
only way to apply the doctrine of good faith is referred to as the 
“excluder analysis.”33  Under this approach, given facts are analyzed 
to see if they fit a category of bad faith that has been developed in the 
case law.34  Good faith, under this definition, existed only in the 
absence of bad faith.35 
While not all states have adopted these three exceptions, all fifty 
states have enacted at least one of the three exceptions to the 
employment-at-will rule.  The public policy exception is the most 
pervasive and at the same time the most narrowly construed of the 
exceptions.  A court would need to find an explicit public policy that 
is being violated by the discharge.  The implied-in-fact contract 
exception is much broader in that it can apply to a large segment of 
employee discharges.  However, the employee has the burden of 
proving that the facts of her case warrant an implication of a just-
cause employment contract.  The implied-in-law or good-faith 
exception is the broadest in scope and least recognized in the fifty 
states.  Its breadth is unlimited in that it implies a duty of good faith 
into every employment relationship.  The employee has the burden to 
 
Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law’s Subsequent 
Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1161. 
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) states, “Every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement.”  See also U.C.C. § 1-304 (revised 2001) (codifying the good faith and fair 
dealing requirement). 
32 See Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 28, at 812–13 (explaining 
the various ways courts have applied good faith and the variety of facts where good faith 
has been applied); Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law, supra note 28, at 
195 (arguing that, while scholars can agree that good faith is a minimum standard, the 
varied forms that bad faith takes serve as evidence that defining it is a continued problem). 
33 Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 28, at 820–21. 
34 Id.; see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of 
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 
1086–87 (2006). 
35 Bird, supra note 6, at 559–60. 
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prove that her employer had a bad-faith motive or reason for the 
discharge.  However, in spite of these exceptions, the doctrine of 
employment at will remains firmly entrenched as the default 
termination rule in the United States. 
II 
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CONTRACT 
Most employers understand the discretion that employment at will 
provides.  The freedom to terminate employees at will has numerous 
benefits.  Firms can make rapid shifts in employment staffing to 
respond to economic declines or economic expansions.  Knowing that 
employees are relatively easy to terminate, employers are encouraged 
to hire workers more quickly in times of rapid growth or seasonal 
demand.  Employment at will also increases the incentive for 
employers to make labor, rather than capital, investments.  For 
example, the flexibility provided by employment at will may lead a 
bank to elect to hire more tellers instead of building ATMs, or an 
employer might choose to hire more workers for an assembly line 
instead of investing resources in mechanical automation. 
As noted above, from personal and societal perspectives, the 
employment-at-will rule is not purely a source of harm.  The rule 
provides nimbleness and flexibility that allows the economy to 
respond to the demands of the marketplace.36  The extensive safety 
net of employee protections found in European countries correlates 
with higher rates of unemployment.37  The costs of discharging an 
 
36 As one international employment counsel explains in the context of a company 
acquisition: 
[A] stock (shares) buyer enjoys an unusual flexibility as to its newly-acquired 
American employees because of the unique U.S. doctrine of employment-at-will. 
A buyer that has recently acquired the stock of some other business remains free 
to lay off all its newly-acquired U.S. employees without paying any severance 
charges [unless exceptions apply] . . . 
Going beyond lay-offs, U.S. employment-at-will leaves non-unionized 
employers—and hence stock buyers—unshackled by vested rights obligations to 
maintain work conditions after closing.  A stock buyer is generally free to reduce 
existing terms/conditions of newly-acquired non-union U.S. employees, to 
demote them, to discontinue their benefits, to reduce their pay, to change their 
job titles, and otherwise to restructure . . . 
Donald C. Dowling, Jr., International HR Best Practice Tips: Summer 2010: Conducting 
Internal Employee Investigation Outside the U.S., 19 INT’L HR J. 1 (2010). 
37 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of 
the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 921 (1996) (“The 
DIMATTEO 1/31/2012  1:37 PM 
460 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 449 
employee in some European countries, such as through the payment 
of an indemnity and extensive notice requirements, tilt the decision in 
close cases toward not hiring. 
Despite the above benefits of the at-will rule, an employment 
contract is not just another contract.  The harm caused to the 
discharged employee may go far beyond a monetary loss.  A person’s 
job is a core part of a person’s self-worth.  An involuntary discharge 
may shatter the employee’s self-image and place enormous stress on 
the employee and her family.38  A loss of work can provoke feelings 
of guilt and inadequacy.39  A discharged employee suffers from “an 
increased likelihood of depression, alcohol and drug abuse, physical 
illness, and even suicide.”40  In many ways, the workplace has 
supplanted the church and neighborhood as a primary source of 
relational networks, self-identity, reputational status, and social 
class.41  It is not surprising that an employee’s reaction to being fired 
might provoke a concerted defensive action, an emotional response, 
or a significant change in the employee’s perceptions of the former 
employer. 
The employer is not legally responsible for the personal harm 
caused by termination.  In the general course of running a business, 
hiring and firing of employees is a necessity.  However, the employer 
is morally, and as a matter of good business practice professionally, 
obligated to mitigate the harm caused by the employment discharge.  
 
neglect of laissez-faire policies among continental members of the European Union is now 
so notorious that a new word—“Eurosclerosis”—has been coined to describe the high 
unemployment and slow growth engendered by excessive regulation and taxation.”); 
Council Directive 94/45/EC, art. 1, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64, 66 (requiring large companies to 
establish employee work councils that need to be consulted before a workforce reduction).  
For a discussion of the Directive’s role in employment termination, see Brian Bercusson, 
Labour Regulation in a Transnational Economy, 6 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 244, 
265–66 (1999). 
38 Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
149, 162 (2005).  Discharge and the unemployment that follows it trigger family strife and 
influence how the children of the unemployed view the world and their own future role in 
it.  Id. 
39 Id. (citing Connie T. Schliebner & John T. Peregoy, Unemployment Effects on the 
Family and the Child: Interventions for Counselors, 72 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 368, 368 
(1994) (“The stresses of unemployment can manifest themselves in depression, alcohol 
and other drug abuse, suicide, physical illness, and family abuse.”)); see also Lea E. 
Waters & Kathleen A. Moore, Predicting Self-Esteem During Unemployment: The Effect 
of Gender, Financial Deprivation, Alternate Roles, and Social Support, 39 J. EMP. 
COUNSELING 171, 171 (2002) (discussing the factors affecting the self-esteem of the 
unemployed). 
40 Bird, supra note 38. 
41 Id. at 161. 
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An employer who fires an employee on a moment’s notice and 
without reason may not breach a legal contract, but the manner of the 
discharge will enhance the perceived harm of the employee.  A loyal 
employee is likely to feel betrayed and suffer a sense of a breach of 
trust based upon expectations extending from the employee to the 
employer.  This bundle of mental expectations that an employee has 
with his or her employer is known as the psychological contract. 
A.  The Psychological Contract Construct 
The psychological contract represents an employee’s perception of 
“the mutual obligations that exist between the employee and his/her 
organization.”42  Psychological contracts emerge in organizations 
when an employee perceives that the contribution she makes obligates 
her employer to reciprocate.43  The psychological contract represents 
the bundle of employee expectations that the employer will behave in 
a certain fashion based upon promises or past practices.  Research on 
psychological contracts has largely focused on the perceptions and 
expectations of employees.44  In organizational behavior literature, 
the word “contract” in psychological contract is used as a construct or 
metaphor.45  Psychological contracts are not legally enforceable 
contracts.46 
Despite the disparity between contract and psychological contract, 
psychological contract theory has a long history, originating from 
social contract theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, who described the 
 
42 Jill Kickul & Scott W. Lester, Broken Promises: Equity Sensitivity as a Moderator 
Between Psychological Contract Breach and Employee Attitudes and Behavior, 16 J. BUS. 
& PSYCHOL. 191, 192 (2001).  Professors Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly provide the 
following definition: “The psychological contract is defined as an individual’s 
expectations regarding the obligations that exist between an employee and an organization.  
Psychological contracts involve only the employee’s beliefs and expectations; it is not 
necessary that the other party in the exchange relationship share these expectations.”  
Jonathan L. Johnson & Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly, The Effects of Psychological Contract 
Breach and Organizational Cynicism: Not All Social Exchange Violations Are Created 
Equal, 24 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 627, 628–29 (2003) (citation omitted). 
43 See Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, supra note 42, at 629. 
44 The perceptions of the employer relating to the psychological contract have also been 
examined.  See, e.g., Amanuel G. Tekleab & M. Susan Taylor, Aren’t There Two Parties 
in an Employment Relationship? Antecedents and Consequences of Organization—
Employee Agreement on Contract Obligations and Violations, 24 J. ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. 585, 585–86 (2003) (noting the prevalence of employee-focused research and 
focusing instead on employer perceptions). 
45 Mark V. Roehling, The Origins and Early Development of the Psychological 
Contract Construct, 3 J. MGMT. HIST. 204, 204 (1997). 
46 See Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, supra note 42. 
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presence of an overarching social contract.47  This social contract 
assumed that individuals living in a state of nature tacitly consent to 
develop an organized civilization.48  The social contract constitutes a 
reciprocal agreement between citizens and the state whereby the state 
offers services in exchange for citizens paying taxes, shouldering 
defense responsibilities, and obeying laws.49  Management 
researchers, beginning in the late 1950s, first described a 
psychological contract through an inducement-contribution model, 
whereby employees receive pay and benefit inducements in exchange 
for contributions to the firm.50  At the same time, a leading 
psychiatrist of the time hypothesized that contractual relationships 
involve the mutual satisfaction of the parties’ psychological needs, 
such as the pleasure of companionship, in addition to the explicit 
contractual exchange.51 
When the “psychological contract” term emerged in the early 
1960s, scholars characterized it at the time as an implicit 
understanding of terms between employees and employers.  One 
scholar observed that workers maintained high production levels with 
minimal grievances in exchange for receiving fair wages and 
treatment from their employer.52  One scholar interviewed utility 
company employees and learned that employees perceived their 
employer to be duty bound to satisfy employee expectations.53 
As the psychological contract literature expanded, scholars 
redefined the term from one expressing mutual obligations to a one-
sided perspective radiating from the expectations formed within the 
minds of employees.54  This shift in focus coincided with significant 
new trends in the workplace, including increased instances of 
corporate restructuring; downsizing; and the use of contingent, 
 
47 Roehling, supra note 45, at 205. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958) (discussing a 
theory of formal organizations). 
51 KARL MENNINGER, THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE 21 (1958). 
52 CHRIS ARGYRIS, UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 96 (1960). 
53 Roehling, supra note 45, at 207 (quoting HARRY LEVINSON ET AL., MEN, 
MANAGEMENT, AND MENTAL HEALTH 20 (1962)). 
54 Abigail Marks, Developing a Multiple Foci Conceptualization of the Psychological 
Contract, 23 EMP. REL. 454, 455 (2001). 
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temporary, or leased workers.55  Employees stuck in the old system of 
career-long employment were the victims of widespread layoffs.56 
Psychological contracts today are believed to possess certain 
characteristics.  First, an employee’s psychological contract may not 
be perceived as an obligation by the organization.57  Second, 
psychological contracts arise from both formal and informal cues.  
These expectations often take the form of explicit oral promises or are 
derived from company policies, but they may also originate from 
casual statements, patterns of conduct, and implicit social signals.58  
Third, employees hold psychological contracts with multiple 
constituencies, including various individual managers and the 
organization as a whole.59  Finally, psychological contracts change as 
the employee’s relationship with the organization grows over time.60  
These changes can result from task changes assigned by the 
organization, entry of new management, shifting economic 
conditions, and updated organizational policies. 
Psychological contracts play an important role in employee 
perceptions and decision making related to the workplace.  This is 
especially important given the increasingly unstable workplace that 
modern employers have created over time, either inadvertently or by 
design.61  Cradle-to-grave employment for employees has largely 
disappeared, thus creating significant uncertainty as to the meaning of 
 
55 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & René Sacasas, Employee Leasing: No Panacea, 
BUS. & ECON. REV., July–Sept. 1995, at 16 (examining legal issues relating to employee 
leasing).  The once-stable employment relationship that characterized the American 
workplace was transformed into one characterized by job insecurity, increased employee 
mobility, and ever-evolving skill sets.  See Kenneth P. De Meuse et al., An Investigation of 
the Relational Component of the Psychological Contract Across Time, Generation, and 
Employment Status, 13 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 102, 102–03 (2001). 
56 Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the 
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 551 (2001). 
57 Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Sandra L. Robinson, When Employees Feel Betrayed: A 
Model of How Psychological Contract Violation Develops, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 226, 
228 (1997). 
58 Jill Kickul & Matthew A. Liao-Troth, The Meaning Behind the Message: Climate 
Perceptions and the Psychological Contract, 18 MID-AM. J. BUS. 23, 24 (2003). 
59 Peter Herriot & Carole Pemberton, Contracting Careers, 49 HUM. REL. 757, 760–62 
(1996). 
60 De Meuse et al., supra note 55, at 102. 
61 T. Leigh Anenson & Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Corporate America: Private 
Pension Liability and Proposals for Reform, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 495, 514–15 
(2007); see Scott W. Fielding, Note, Free Competition or Corporate Theft?: The Need for 
Courts to Consider the Employment Relationship in Preliminary Steps Disputes, 52 VAND. 
L. REV. 201, 229 n.141 (1999). 
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the employer-employee relationship.62  One certainty is that the 
corporate restructuring and downsizing policies implemented during 
the 1980s and 1990s have significantly changed the employment 
relationship.63  These strategies have arguably miscalculated the 
critical role that employees play in an organization’s long-term 
success.64  Despite the changes in the nature of the employment 
relationship, the psychological contract continues to play an important 
role, especially in the area of employee discharge. 
As a result of employer insensitivity and lack of commitment to 
retaining a loyal, long-term labor force, there is evidence of the 
lowering of employee expectations.  Employees’ expectations are 
lower today than they were in generations past.65  However, the 
lowering of expectations does not mean the elimination of 
expectations.  As such, employers continue to break psychological 
contracts.66  For example, one study discovered that as many as fifty-
five percent of recent MBA graduates believed that their employers 
had broken their psychological contracts within the first two years of 
employment.67  Another study reported that twenty-five percent of 
respondents, employees surveyed during a company restructuring, 
reported significant psychological contract violations.68  An 
increasing number of today’s employees believe they have suffered 
an injustice or have been treated unfairly by their employers. 
Despite the many studies of employment at will and the 
psychological contract, scholarship has not sufficiently illuminated 
the underlying factors that influence employee attitudes during a 
discharge.  One can easily speculate that poorly treated employees are 
more likely to react negatively to discharge, but the specific source of 
the negative reaction remains unclear.  Furthermore, there has been 
insufficient research into what types of actions employers can take—
prior to and at the time of discharge—to mitigate an employee’s 
negative reaction.  No employee likes to be fired, but certain factors 
 
62 Ronald R. Sims, Human Resource Management’s Role in Clarifying the New 
Psychological Contract, 33 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 373, 374 (1994). 
63 DeMeuse et al., supra note 55, at 102. 
64 See Jeffrey Pfeffer, Seven Practices of Successful Organizations, 40 CAL. MGMT. 
REV. 96, 97–100 (1998). 
65 Bird, supra note 38, at 166. 
66 Id.; Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 248. 
67 Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the Psychological Contract: 
Not the Exception but the Norm, 15 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 245, 252 (1994). 
68 William H. Turnley & Daniel C. Feldman, Psychological Contract Violations During 
Corporate Restructuring, 37 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 71, 74 (1998). 
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exist that can be manipulated by the employer to lessen the 
psychological trauma of employees and reduce the legal costs to 
employers. 
Few workers find comfort in the knowledge that the loss of their 
job keeps labor costs down and allows capital to flow to more 
efficient companies or industries.  Employment law’s at-will doctrine 
provides a bright-line rule, but employees perceive the law as 
providing protections, such as just-cause dismissal, that it in fact does 
not provide.69  The study presented here measures employee 
perceptions of just and fair treatment at the termination of 
employment and whether the perceptions of fair versus unfair 
treatment predict employee responses to termination.  Alternatively 
stated, is the employer able to control the psychological contract in 
order to minimize negative employee responses at termination? 
The survey examines two broad areas relating to antecedents to 
employment discharge and their effects on employee responses.  First, 
it examines whether the level of employee knowledge of the law of 
employment impacts reactions to an employment discharge.  Second, 
the survey examines whether procedural safeguards in the discharge 
process, as well as the substantive appropriateness of the discharge, 
impact an individual’s reaction to an employment discharge.  The 
survey presented in this Article aims to address these important 
questions.  The next Part discusses the nature of the survey, including 
methodology, findings, and results. 
III 
THE EMPLOYEE PERCEPTION SURVEY: DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND 
FINDINGS 
The present study provides the findings of a written, empirical 
survey of 763 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
management course.  Participants were randomly provided one of 
twelve discharge scenarios.70  All twelve scenarios expressed 
variations of three key variables: (1) procedural fairness–procedural 
unfairness, (2) substantive fairness–substantive unfairness, and (3) no 
information-cueing–education of employee on employment law.71 
 
69 See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL. L. REV. 105 (1997). 
70 See infra Appendix A for a sampling of the discharge scenarios. 
71 Id. 
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The first variable examined is the impact of procedural fairness or 
unfairness on employment discharge reactions.  For purposes of this 
Article, procedural fairness is the concept of whether an employment 
discharge decision incorporated justice-related factors.72  For 
example, procedural fairness might involve the opportunity to be 
heard and an open and fair evaluation of the necessity for the 
discharge before the employer reaches the decision to terminate.  This 
should be followed by a reasonable amount of advance notice of 
discharge. 
In this survey, we manipulated procedural fairness through the 
production of two different scenarios.  One scenario given was 
procedurally fair. 73  The first paragraph explained the available 
procedural rights in the company employee manual.74  The second 
paragraph showed that the process of discharge outlined in the 
employment manual was followed completely and provided a number 
of opportunities for review and improvement.75 
The other scenario treated the employee with procedural 
unfairness.76  The first paragraph was identical to the procedurally 
fair scenario in that it described the rights the employee possessed in 
the company employment manual.77  But, the second paragraph 
described the actual employee’s treatment as involving standards of 
evaluation and a shorter notice of discharge, contrary to the policies 
set out in the company manual.78 
The second variable involved the impact of substantive fairness on 
employment discharge reactions.  Substantive fairness, a related 
concept to substantive justice, “focuses on the fairness or 
 
72 See, e.g., David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design 
Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) 
(“‘[P]rocedural justice’ involves the extent to which citizens value a process because of its 
procedural features.”); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by 
Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128 
(1988) (defining “procedural justice” as a measurement of participants' satisfaction with 
the decision-making processes underlying a particular decision). 
73 See infra Appendix A § 1.1. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. § 1.2. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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appropriateness of a procedure’s outcomes.”79  Substantive fairness is 
concerned with whether the ultimate employment decision made was 
correct.  A substantively fair result would be the case where the 
discharge was based on a “good” reason, such as incompetence or 
insubordination.  Where procedural fairness focuses on just process, 
substantive fairness focuses on just outcomes. 
Substantive fairness was manipulated in a fashion similar to 
procedural fairness, with the presentation of one scenario highlighting 
a substantively fair decision and another depicting a substantively 
unfair decision.80  In the fair scenario, the survey described a situation 
where the employee was fired for poor job performance.81  In the 
unfair scenario, the employee was discharged because she is 
overweight.82 
The third variable was designed to examine the impact of 
educating employees about available legal rights.  Survey respondents 
were presented with one of three scenarios, varying according to the 
amount of legal information provided.  The first scenario, which was 
used as a control variable, provided no legal information at all to the 
respondent.83  Instead, the respondent was given information about 
the firm’s size and competitive position unrelated to employment 
law.84 
The second scenario provided limited information at the time of 
hire about employment discharge, which was defined in the study as 
cueing.85  In the cueing scenario, respondents were told about the 
employment-at-will rule and were informed about exceptions to 
employment at will that can arise from company policies and 
employee handbooks.86  The cueing prompt also informed 
respondents about the duty of employers to act in good faith.87  The 
 
79 Markell & Tyler, supra note 72.  See generally Nancy Ehrenreich, Foreword: 
Conceptualizing Substantive Justice, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 533 (2010) (exploring 
broader definitions of substantive justice). 
80 See infra Appendix A § 2. 
81 Id. § 2.1. 
82 Id. § 2.2. 
83 Id. § 3.1. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. § 3.2. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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prompt raised the possibility that an insincere reason for firing can 
“lead to a claim of ‘wrongful discharge.’”88 
The third and final scenario was the educating prompt.89  In this 
prompt, all prior information about employment at will and its 
exceptions were provided to the survey participant.90  In addition to 
this material, however, the educating prompt explained that firms can 
disclaim company policy statements implying discharge protection.91  
A clause found in the firm’s employee handbook was then provided 
to the respondent.92  The clause disclaimed all employee protections 
against at-will termination.93 
Once a particular procedural condition (procedural fairness or 
unfairness), substantive condition (substantive fairness or unfairness), 
and law condition (control, cueing, or educating) was provided to a 
respondent, the respondent received a questionnaire.94  The 
questionnaire inquired, in part, about the respondent’s attitudes 
toward the company given the scenario provided.95  Respondents 
were asked about their litigation intentions, specifically, whether they 
would consider legal action against the employer.96  The core thesis 
of this Article is not that such intentions are realistic responses from 
frustrated employees, but that these reactions may be muted or 
amplified by the conditions surrounding the discharge and the 
employee’s knowledge of the law.97 
 
88 Id.  This is a broad reading of the limitations imposed by exceptions to employment 
at will, as employers are not required to give sincere rationales for every discharge.  See, 
e.g., Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Intentional Misrepresentation in Hiring and 
the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 587, 591–92 (2006); Barbara 
Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effects on Employees—Adaptation of the Tort of 
Wrongful Discharge, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 362, 373 (1986) (“Strict adherence to the 
employment-at-will doctrine in the business closing context would mean that an employer 
could plan to close its place of business, misrepresent this plan by giving the employees 
false assurances of job security, use the workers' fear of job loss as a lever to extract 
concessions from them, and then close as originally planned with no liability to the 
employees.”). 
89 See infra Appendix A § 3.3. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See infra Appendix B. 
95 The questions presented in Appendix B were excerpted from a lengthier 
questionnaire examining other topics such as task performance, citizenship behavior, and 
withdrawal behavior.  The full survey is on file with the authors. 
96 See infra Appendix B. 
97 See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance 
in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 983 (1999) 
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As a result of this survey design, we proposed six hypotheses for 
testing.  These hypotheses can be grouped into two categories: 
Knowledge Hypotheses and Fairness Hypotheses.  The three 
Knowledge Hypotheses are expressed as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The control variable involves scenarios where 
employees were provided no information on the law of 
employment.  Hypothesis 1 proposes that employees with no 
knowledge (and provided no information) of employee discharge 
law (the employment-at-will doctrine) are the most likely to pursue 
litigation and retaliation against their employer at the time of 
termination compared to those cued or educated on employment 
discharge law. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Employees who are cued as to the employment-
at-will doctrine at the time of hire are less likely to pursue litigation 
than those with no knowledge of employment law. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Employees who are more fully educated by the 
employer at the time of hire are even less likely to pursue litigation 
than those who are simply cued as to the employment-at-will 
doctrine. 
The Knowledge Hypotheses and Fairness Hypotheses were both 
tested with analysis of variance (ANOVA).  The ANOVA compared 
the mean levels of litigation intentions across the procedural fairness, 
substantive fairness, and law conditions.  With respect to the latter, 
the results revealed significant mean differences for litigation 
intentions across the control, cueing, and educating conditions: 
F(2,763) = 2.94, p<.05.98  However, most of that effect was due to the 
educating condition.  Thus, Hypothesis 1 was confirmed in 
relationship to the education variable but was only marginally 
correlated in relationship to the cueing variable.  In the end, the 
cueing variable reduced the rate of retaliation, but not by a 
statistically significant amount.  Hypothesis 3 was supported, 
however, in that respondents who were more thoroughly educated by 
the employer at the time of hire were less likely to pursue litigation 
 
(giving a trade publication’s ominous warning that “[a]ll too often, terminated employees 
will retaliate against their former employers by bringing frivolous discrimination lawsuits” 
(citing John J. Myers, Reduce the Risk of Frivolous Lawsuits, in GETTING RESULTS…FOR 
THE HANDS-ON MANAGER, Oct. 1997, at 7)); Francoise Gilbert, Seven Drivers for Privacy 
& Security Issues in a Down Economy, 13 J. INTERNET L. 3, 4 (2009) (“Disgruntled 
employees may retaliate or express their anger with the lay-offs by attempting criminal 
actions against the company's databases. . . .  In other cases, disgruntled employees have 
accessed the company's databases and modified or destroyed personal data or introduced 
viruses or malware into the systems.”). 
98 See infra figure 2 for a graphical depiction of the pattern of results. 
DIMATTEO 1/31/2012  1:37 PM 
470 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 449 
than the participants in either the control or cueing conditions.  One 
can surmise that the greater the amount of education, with cueing 
being viewed as a superficial form of education, the lower the rate of 
litigation. 
In sum, the data confirmed two of the three hypotheses proposed.99  
Hypothesis 1 was confirmed in that respondents who were educated 
were less likely to consider litigation than the respondents who were 
provided no information about the employment-at-will doctrine.100  In 
the absence of such experience or other knowledge, the respondents 
would likely apply their own “fairness heuristic” to the discharge 
hypothetical.  Individuals use a fairness heuristic when they lack clear 
objective criteria for evaluating the propriety of a particular 
decision.101  In the absence of such criteria, individuals form fairness 
judgments from whatever information is readily available.102  This is 
particularly true when decisions have to be made quickly (such as in a 
survey).  The heuristic provides a shortcut to decision making for 
someone not possessing full information.103  Such a heuristic “frees 
up cognitive resources and [provides] confidence in” the decision or 
action reached.104  Fairness heuristics can also be used as a shortcut to 
decide whether a particular authority can be trusted.105 
  
 
99 See infra figure 1. 
100 Undergraduate students, the respondents in this survey, are not likely to have a 
working knowledge of the doctrine of employment at will. 
101 Russell Cropanzano et al., Moral Virtues, Fairness Heuristics, Social Entities, and 
Other Denizens of Organizational Justice, 58 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 164, 170 (2001). 
102 Id. 
103 See id. 
104 Id. 
105 Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems 
for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 39–40 (2008). 
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as unjust and worthy of retaliation or litigation behaviors, respondents 
may have perceived the discharge less negatively because it did not 
deviate substantially from the legal rules on which they were 
educated.  The implication is that when the respondents were made 
more fully aware of the limited nature of employment protections, 
they demonstrated a lower propensity or desire to take action against 
the discharging firm. 
To reemphasize, in the “educated” respondent scenario, as noted 
earlier, respondents are told that a disclaimer in an employee manual 
can override other assurances of long-term employment.107  The 
respondents are then told that the firm has such a disclaimer.108  In 
fact, the disclaimer is rather detailed and conspicuous, comprising a 
bolded ninety words, which in essence informs the reader that even 
though a manual with policies exists, it is not binding on the 
employer.109  The disclaimer clause also states that the employer can 
amend or terminate the policies and benefits at any time.110  Perhaps 
the scenario is evidence of the power of disclaimers when properly 
presented to new hires.  In the education scenario, the company 
representatives discuss the disclaimer and its legality.111 
The key factor is likely not the disclaimer itself, but how it was 
presented and explained.  Without such a presentation and thorough 
explanation of the disclaimer and how it relates to company policies 
and employment termination, the firm’s treatment of legal rights may 
be construed as invidious in nature.  An employer who emphasizes its 
company’s pro-employee benefits and polices, but at the same time 
“hides” or fails to explain the termination-at-will disclaimer, will 
likely be viewed by the employee as misrepresenting firm policies.  
Such policies provide a false but intended illusion that the firm is a 
fair and equitable organization. 112  The manual acts as a prod for 
 
107 See infra Appendix A § 3.3.  See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks 
and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326 (1992); Natalie Bucciarelli 
Pedersen, A Subjective Approach to Contracts?: How Courts Interpret Employee 
Handbook Disclaimers, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101 (2008); Cynthia Weber 
Scherb, Note, The Use of Disclaimers to Avoid Employer Liability Under Employee 
Handbook Provisions, 12 J. CORP. L. 105 (1986). 
108 See infra Appendix A § 3.3. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Joseph Lawson, Give your Employees a Hand (Book), LEGAL MGMT., Nov.–Dec. 
1999, at 24, 32 (“In an era of increasing litigation, having clearly written and 
communicated guidelines will help ensure a professional, equitable environment that can 
protect a professional service firm from legal liability.”).  The trade publication also 
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unsuspecting employees to construct a normative-relational mindset 
of the employer-employee contract that in fact does not legally exist.  
This scenario allows the company to project positive signals of trust 
by promising benefits without undertaking any obligation to provide 
those benefits. 
Purposeful evasion of the existence of the disclaimer clause at the 
time of hire is likely to produce unintended consequences.  First, on 
the legal side, courts may construe the continuance of polices that are 
contrary to at-will employment, especially when reinforced post-hire, 
as working a modification of the initial employment-at-will nature of 
the relationship.  Second, without a full explanation of the 
relationship between the disclaimer and the company’s employee-
friendly policies relating to termination, the employee may process 
the multitude of employee-friendly policies to create a false 
perception of the firm as one that is committed to the nurturing of 
long-term employer-employee relationships.  The study shows that a 
fuller explanation (education) significantly reduces employees’ rates 
of retaliation and litigation.  The conjecture here is that if not done 
properly, the cognitive dissonance between the firm’s employee-
friendly policies and a subsequent strict use of employment at will is 
likely to heighten negative attitudes toward the organization.  
Employees wittingly or unwittingly perceive the diminishment of 
employee valuation as a breach of the underlying understanding 
(psychological contract) between the employer and the employee.  In 
hindsight, the employee perceives the dissonance of the marketing by 
the employer of an employee-friendly relationship and strict 
enforcement of employment at will as a type of misrepresentation or 
fraud perpetuated by the firm.  The sense of being tricked or betrayed 
results in the ex-employee viewing the firm more negatively at the 
time of discharge. 
As explained earlier, we also tested the reactions of respondents to 
various fairness-related scenarios.  We express the set of three 
Fairness Hypotheses as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Employees who experience procedural fairness 
will be less likely to pursue litigation than employees who 
experience procedural unfairness. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Employees who experience substantive fairness 
will be less likely to pursue litigation than employees who 
experience substantive unfairness. 
 
explains that employee handbooks can promote a better understanding of a firm’s policies, 
increase consistency and credibility, and enhance recruitment.  Id. at 26–30. 
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HYPOTHESIS 6: Employees who experience the combination of 
procedural fairness and substantive fairness will be less likely to 
pursue litigation than employees experiencing only procedural 
fairness or only substantive fairness. 
The Fairness Hypotheses were tested with the same ANOVA. The 
results revealed significant mean differences for litigation intentions 
across the two procedural conditions: F(1,763) = 72.60, p<.001.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, employees who experienced procedural 
fairness had lower litigation intentions (mean = 2.50) than employees 
who experienced procedural unfairness (mean = 3.12).  It should be 
noted that the study conceived procedural fairness purely as a process.  
In the scenarios, the employee handbook clearly describes the process 
that would be followed prior to termination, including (1) a six-month 
review with notice if the evaluation is considered as substandard—the 
notice would suggest that the employee seek guidance from the 
human resource department or the company’s informal mentoring 
program, (2) a second six-month review—if the second review 
includes another substandard review notice, then the employee is 
given a three-month probationary period in order to improve, and a 
senior manager is assigned as a mentor, and finally, (3) upon the 
determination of continued substandard performance, the employee is 
given a two-week notice of discharge.  If the employer follows this 
process as expressed to the employee, then this is construed as a case 
of procedural fairness.  The study does not measure interactional 
justice, which relates to treatment and not to the specifics of the 
process.113  Studies have shown that procedural fairness as a predictor 
of employee outcomes can be negatively affected if the employee 
feels mistreated or disrespected during the implementation of the 
procedures.114  In addition, the previous study concluded that 
procedural fairness is most effective when the breach relates to 
extrinsic values (pay, rewards), while interactive fairness is a key 
factor when the breach involves intrinsic values (projects, 
 
113 See Jill Kickul et al., Promise Breaking During Radical Organizational Change: Do 
Justice Interventions Make a Difference?, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 469, 472 
(2002) [hereinafter Promise Breaking].  The importance of interactional justice is not to be 
downplayed and its impact has been measured in other studies.  See, e.g., Jill R. Kickul et 
al., Settling the Score: The Role of Organizational Justice in the Relationship Between 
Psychological Contract Breach and Anticitizenship Behavior, 13 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 
77 (2001) [hereinafter Settling the Score] (interactional injustice positively correlated to 
increased levels of anticitizenship behavior). 
114 Kickul, Lester & Finkl note that interactional justice in the case of a psychological 
contract breaches include “sensitivity, concern, empathy, and above all else respect to . . . 
[the] disgruntled employees.”  Promise Breaking, supra note 113, at 485. 
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 The survey also confirmed Hypothesis 6.  A combination of 
procedural and substantive fairness produced an interaction effect in 
the ANOVA: F(1, 763) = 22.31, p<.001.120  The presence of both 
types of fairness amplified the rate of decrease in litigation pursued 
by discharged employees.  Some studies indicate that procedural 
justice accounts for more variance than distributive justice in 
predicting work-related attitudes.121  However, Greenberg stresses 
that “the real issue is not which form of justice is more important but 
how they operate together.”122  The current study supports this 
supposition by showing the synergistic effects that occur when 
procedural fairness is combined with substantive fairness.  When 
substantive fairness exists, the effects of procedural fairness amplify 
perceptions of company fairness.  The amplification effect is shown 
in Figure 2.  The lighter-shaded columns show higher rates of 
retaliation intentions without the amplification effect.  The darker-
shaded columns show that substantive fairness lowered the rate of 
retaliation in relation to cases of substantive unfairness.  Both 
columns on the right show the amplified effect.  The lighter column 
on the right shows cases of substantive fairness combined with 
procedural unfairness; the darker column on the right shows a drastic 
reduction in the rate of retaliation when there is combined substantive 
and procedural fairness.  The rate of retaliation in the amplified 
scenario is nearly one-half of the rate when there is substantive and 
procedural unfairness.  Put simply, substantive fairness without 
procedural fairness positively, but moderately, impacts the fairness 
attitudes of the firm’s employees.  Substantive or procedural fairness 
alone only moderately reduce litigiousness.  Substantive and 
procedural fairness together produce substantial reductions in rates of 
litigation and retaliation.  Finally, in cases where procedural fairness 
existed, employees that received no information of their rights under 
employment law showed higher rates of litigation propensity than 
those who were educated. 
 
120 See figure 2 for a graphical depiction of the pattern of results. 
121 See, e.g., Sheldon Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of Procedural and 
Distributive Justice in Organizational Behavior, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 177 (1987). 
122 GREENBERG, supra note 116, at 403. 
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IV 
NORMS IN CONTRACT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
The study focused on the roles of knowledge communication and 
fairness in affecting employees’ perceptions at the time of 
termination.  The findings support claims that employees’ perceptions 
of their employers at the time of termination are heavily affected by 
perceptions of fairness, and to a lesser extent, by knowledge transfer.  
The findings also support an ancillary proposition that the employer 
can manipulate the employees’ perceptions of fair termination 
through practices of education, procedural justice practices, and by 
providing fair rationales for dismissal.  Parts IV and V extrapolate 
from these findings to analyze the similarities between legal 
employment contracts and psychological contracts.  The importance 
of norms to both contract law and employment relationships will be 
explored in this Part.  The prominent role played by the fairness norm 
in creating expectations both psychologically and legally will provide 
the common ground in analyzing the role that psychological contract 
theory can play in reforming employment law.  The importance of 
expectations and the ability to manage expectations will be explored 
in Part V.  Finally, the importance of norms and expectations as 
represented by the psychological contract, and their affinity to the 
norms of contract law, will be used in Part VI to justify reforms to the 
law of employment.  The means to reform are found in existing 
structures within the law of contracts.  The suggested guide for 
reforming employment law is through a process of aligning the norms 
and expectations of contract law with those of the psychological 
contract. 
A.  Norms and Contract Law 
One theme that is common to legal employment contracts and 
psychological contracts is that each has a normative basis.  One way 
of explaining the differences between legal employment contracts and 
psychological contracts is that they are based upon different norms.  
However, this would be a premature assessment of their normative 
frameworks.  Most of the norms that underlie the psychological 
contract are found in relational contract theory, and most of the norms 
in relational contract theory are recognized, in some form or degree, 
in mainstream contract law.  The difference is that the strength of 
relational norms found in the psychological contract is more 
pronounced than the application of those norms in contract law.  
DIMATTEO 1/31/2012  1:37 PM 
478 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 449 
Alternatively stated, the composite of norms that underlie legal and 
psychological contracts possess the same ingredients but in varying 
degrees.123 
The employment-at-will doctrine is closely related to the 
predominate norm that contract law is expected to advance—freedom.  
In macro terms, capitalism is based upon a private ordering system.124  
Contract law is the primary means by which private ordering shapes 
the economy and society.  Individuals and entities are free to agree to 
any terms in the formation of a contract.  In the event that the bargain 
struck is one-sided (unfair), it is not contract law’s role to make the 
contract more fair or equitable.  Instead, the contract, barring major 
bargaining failures,125 is strictly enforced.  Hence, if an employer and 
employee enter into an employment-at-will contract, then the at-will 
nature of the contract should be strictly enforced. 
Even though the freedom-of-contract principle is the dominant 
norm, it is only one of many norms that underlie contract law.126  The 
rationales for contract law stem from a composite that includes the 
norms of autonomy, fairness, justice, reliance, predictability, 
certainty, efficiency, and the morality of promise keeping.127 
The composite or parts of the composite are used to justify 
particular rules or principles of contract law.  The norms also are 
used, often implicitly, in the application of contract rules to actual 
cases.  Ultimately, the composite of norms listed above can be 
distilled into often competing metanorms of private autonomy 
(freedom of contract) and fairness of the exchange.  Justice Cardozo 
 
123 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 
(1996) (arguing that social norms can be used to advance legal objectives). 
124 The employment relationship’s at-will principle masks a general tension between the 
view of employment relationships at the sole creation of market economics and the 
conception of the relationship as one dominated by the employer.  See Clyde W. Summers, 
Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 65 (2000) (arguing that employee-related protections are insufficient). 
125 Bargaining flaws primarily relate to the genuineness of consent.  Contracts are 
legally enforceable agreements.  As such, the parties must mutually consent to the 
bindingness of the agreement and to the terms of the agreement.  If there is no mutual 
assent, then there can be no contract.  Such consent may be seen as present at the time of 
the agreement, but a court may later determine that the consent was flawed.  The presence 
of mutual mistake as to the subject of the contract, a unilateral mistake that the non-
mistaken party could not have been unaware, duress or undue influence used by one party 
over the other, and misrepresentation by one of the parties are all means to challenge the 
genuineness of consent and thereby determine if the contract is enforceable. 
126 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law 
of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 435 (1995). 
127 Id. 
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described law as a process of resolving the inner tension between 
freedom and fairness as one in which “[t]he social interest served by 
symmetry or certainty must then be balanced against the social 
interest served by equity and fairness.”128  The psychological contract 
is built upon the fairness norm that is embedded in contract law.  The 
principle of private autonomy is the basis of the employment-at-will 
principle.  The fairness or justice norm is the rationale used to support 
the legal exceptions to employment at will. 
B.  Relational Contract Norms and the Psychological Contract 
Relational contract theory, as espoused by Ian Macneil,129 is the 
foundation upon which psychological contract theory rests.130  
Macneil’s key insight is that enforceable and unenforceable contracts 
are formed within a larger relational and social context.  The larger 
relational or social exchange is based on a cadre of norms not found 
in classical contract law, such as the norms of reciprocity, 
cooperation, and solidarity.  The cooperation and solidarity norms 
reflect the complexity of long-term, relational contracts.  This 
complexity and the changeable nature of such relationships suggest 
that both parties expect to cooperate in order to preserve the common 
purposes of the contract (solidarity).  Macneil states that the 
“[p]ossibility of trouble [is] anticipated as [a] normal part of 
relation[al contracts], to be dealt with by cooperation and other 
restorational techniques.”131  Within the notion of restorational 
techniques, the norm of reciprocity can be used to restore the 
relationship by each party giving up something or giving an additional 
something.  However, one study showed that employees are 
instrumental and not reciprocal in their perceptions of the changing 
obligations of the psychological contract over time.132  The study 
 
128 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921). 
129 For an understanding of Macneil’s view, see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL 
CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. 
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).  See also David 
Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in THE RELATIONAL 
THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 3 (David Campbell ed., 
2001). 
130 Robinson, Kraatz and Rousseau state that “Macneil’s typology of contracts can be 
used to categorize psychological contracts.”  Sandra L. Robinson, Matthew S. Kraatz & 
Denise M. Rousseau, Changing Obligations and the Psychological Contract: A 
Longitudinal Study, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137, 138 (1994) (citation omitted). 
131 Macneil, supra note 129, at 740. 
132 Robinson, Kraatz & Rousseau, supra note 130, at 147. 
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showed that employees perceived their obligations under the 
psychological contract to decrease as their employer’s obligations 
increased.  This type of one-sidedness questions the normative 
viability of the psychological contract and whether it would be 
prudent for employment law to recognize the breach of the 
psychological contract to support employee-generated litigation. 
Professor Robert Hillman acknowledges that the basket of classical 
contract norms needs to be expanded to include the different 
normative basis of relational contracts: “[R]elational norms such as 
cooperation and compromise, rather than promises, largely govern 
these parties’ associations.”133  Indeed, the relational norms of 
planning, trust, and solidarity have moved into the mainstream of 
contract law.  They can be seen at work in collaborative alliances, 
franchising, and joint venturing.134 It is in this space between 
classical contract law’s recognition of enforceable contracts and the 
different normative grounding associated with unenforceable 
relational contracts that psychological contract theory resides. 
There is a deep literature on the role of social norms in producing 
appropriate decisions and actions.  A theme in this literature is that a 
norm may be a more effective means of controlling bad behavior or 
encouraging good behavior than the use of law.135  The psychological 
contract can be simply thought of as a bundle or basket of norms at 
least partially created by the employer.  When the employer follows 
these norms there is little necessity for litigation.  However, when the 
employer violates the norms of employment, then the mantra of 
injustice or unfairness increases the likelihood of litigation and 
retaliation.  The breach of the psychological contract is, in essence, a 
violation of relational norms embedded in certain employment 
relationships.  The effect of an employer establishing (beginning at 
the commencement of employment) social norms of fairness and 
justice is likely to raise employee expectations of just and fair 
termination.136  Just as conformity to norms decreases the need for 
 
133 Robert A. Hillman, Essay, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
103, 124 (1988). 
134 See Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of 
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727 (2010). 
135 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 288 (2001). 
136 One commentator argues that a norm of no discharge without cause currently exists.  
Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in 
Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307 (2002). 
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law or for litigation, violation of the norms increases the likelihood of 
litigation and the need for legal protections for employees. 
C.  Analyzing the Psychological Contract as a Two-Way Exchange 
The norms of fairness or justice provide the strongest normative 
support for the psychological contract.  After about two decades, 
however, the psychological contract literature has not fully explored 
the duality of expectations that form the psychological contract.137  
Instead, it has focused solely upon the expectations of the employee.  
The research has failed to recognize that for every breach of the 
psychological contract by the employer there is a corresponding 
psychological breach that relates to the employee.  This becomes 
clear when we use reasonableness as a surrogate for fairness.  The 
two-way analysis of the psychological contract rests upon a simple 
premise that someone who is acting unreasonably toward another is 
also being unfair.  This simple premise leads to a two-step process in 
assessing expectations.  First, does a party possess certain 
expectations?  Second, are these expectations the product of 
reasonable perceptions—ones that a vast majority of similarly situated 
persons would possess? 
In order to explain the logic of the above paragraph, an analogy to 
employment termination will be used.  The termination of 
employment can be analogized to the cessation of long-term 
contracts.  The difference between the two is that a cessation of a 
long-term contract may be due to a breach of a legal contract, while 
the termination of a long-term employee may be only a breach of a 
psychological contract.  Professor Hillman notes that when the right 
to cessation of a contract is unclear, a “further investigation into the 
meaning of fairness in the cessation context” is required.138 
Hillman elaborates that the fairness norm is, in fact, a number of 
interrelated norms.  Three of these norms relate well to determining 
the reasonableness of a psychological contract.  The first norm that 
 
137 “[R]eseachers view the psychological contract as held by [the] employee[] alone.”  
Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 229.  There are studies that measure employer, as 
well as employee perspectives of the psychological contract and subsequent breaches.  
They mostly confirm that there is considerable incongruence relating to the contract and 
regarding how a breach is perceived.  See, e.g., Scott W. Lester et al., Not Seeing Eye to 
Eye: Differences in Supervisor and Subordinate Perceptions of and Attributions for 
Psychological Contract Breach, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39 (2002). 
138 Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 
CORNELL L. REV. 617, 618 (1983). 
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relates to the psychological contract is closest to what most feel when 
they consider the fairness of an action: “[A] party should not 
knowingly cause harm to another without justification.”139  The 
psychological contract literature assumes this to mean that the 
employer should not terminate an employee without justification.  In 
the present study, the duty not to cause unnecessary harm is captured 
by the existence of substantive and procedural fairness.  It is 
important to note that the employee can also breach the psychological 
contract by acting unreasonably in causing harm to the employer 
through litigation or retaliation.  In contract law, the determination of 
reasonableness is made by applying the reasonable person 
standard.140  The reasonable person standard could be used to 
determine whether the employee’s perceptions or expectations were 
unreasonable.  If they are considered unreasonable, then any 
subsequent litigation or retaliation may be a post hoc breach of the 
psychological contract by the employee. 
The reasonable person standard applies to both transactional 
(discrete) and relational contracts.  The difference is that the 
fabrication of the reasonable person in a relational contract uses 
additional inputs.  The transactional reasonable person is placed in the 
shoes of a party at the time of formation.  The reasonable person is 
imbued with the characteristics of that party and the context at the 
time of formation.  A relational reasonable person in the employment 
setting is placed in a chain of contexts beginning at the time of hiring 
to the termination of the employment.  The termination of an 
employee is viewed not as an isolated act, but as one act within a 
more expansive relationship.  Professor James Gordley asserts that 
through such an expanded analysis the reasonable person must decide 
whether “[t]he parties willed a certain normative relationship.”141  
This is as close as contract law gets to the idea of the psychological 
contract. 
The second norm from Hillman’s typology is “that a party must act 
reasonably to avoid harming” himself or herself.142  In the case of the 
psychological contract, the disgruntled employee may fail to take 
 
139 Id. at 619. 
140 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable 
Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293 (1997) (tracing the 
history and the make-up of the standard). 
141 JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 
241 (1991). 
142 Hillman, supra note 133, at 619. 
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positive action to limit her harm.  The mitigation principle in contract 
law requires the non-breaching party to mitigate her damages.143  An 
example of mitigation avoidance in the employment realm is when an 
ex-employee does not utilize employer benefits that would aid in job 
seeking or fails to actively look for another job.  If she does not, then 
the employer is relieved from any obligations regarding the harm that 
could have been mitigated.  This is especially true when the harm is at 
least partially caused by the unreasonable expectations of the 
employee. 
The final fairness norm involves the determination of overall cost 
and benefits of the employment relationship.  This is the reciprocity 
norm.  Research in the psychological contract literature demonstrates 
the bidirectional nature of the norm of reciprocity.144  The fulfillment 
of perceived employer obligations triggers a feeling of the need to 
reciprocate by the employee.  Conversely, an employer’s failure to 
fulfill its obligations is likely to trigger a reciprocal response by the 
employee.  More likely, the causal flow is in the direction of 
employee to employer.  An example of a lack of reciprocity is when 
the employee goes beyond the performance of minimally required 
obligations and the employer fails to reciprocate.  But given the 
relational nature of employment, a single case of a lack of reciprocity 
should be placed in the context of overall reciprocity.  If the 
psychological contract is relational, then overall reciprocity during the 
course of the employment should be factored into the fairness 
determination.  If at the time of termination the employee has 
received a net benefit attributed to the employment, then the breach-
of-psychological-contract approach loses some of its explanatory and 
normative power.  Psychological contracts aside, if the employee is 
better off due to that particular employment relationship, then it 
becomes more difficult to see the harm caused by the breach of a 
psychological contract from the perspective of the entire relationship.  
The fairness and justice norms are not necessarily on the side of the 
discharged employee.  An example of this is where an employee 
obtains marketable training or skill sets during the employment. 
John Kotter stresses that the psychological contract includes 
potentially thousands of items and therefore divergence of employer 
 
143 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.22, at 609, § 12.8, at 786, § 12.12, at 807 
(3d ed. 1999). 
144 See, e.g., Jacqueline A-M. Coyle-Shapiro & Ian Kessler, Exploring Reciprocity 
Through the Lens of the Psychological Contract: Employee and Employer Perspectives, 
11 EUR. J. WORK & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 69 (2002). 
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and employee expectations is inevitable.145  Given that assumption, 
the psychological contract can be seen as a bundle of matched and 
unmatched expectations.  When the employer and employee 
expectations match, recognition of a breach of the psychological 
contract is both evident and reasonable.  In the case of unmatched 
expectations, the employee’s expectations should be required to reach 
a threshold of reasonableness before being recognized as a breach of 
the psychological contract.  A similar template is found in contract 
law.  The matching of expectations (reasonable interpretations of 
reciprocal promises) is the foundation of a binding contract. 
In cases where only one party (the employer) makes a promise, a 
cause of action for promissory estoppel is available when the 
promisee (the employee) reasonably relies upon the promise.146  
Contract law’s theory of promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance 
encompasses another element found in the psychological contract and 
justice literatures.  The main rationale for promissory estoppel is the 
prevention of injustice.  The requirements of promissory estoppel are 
the giving of a promise or assurance, reasonable reliance, and a 
resulting injustice in the event that the court fails to provide a 
remedy.147  Courts resort to promissory estoppel when an element 
needed to find an enforceable contract is missing. 
Promissory estoppel is used when not providing a remedy of some 
sort would cause an injustice.  This may be the case when a promise 
given by an employer, within the context of an at-will contract, results 
in the employee reasonably and detrimentally relying on the promise.  
An example would be when an employer makes a promise to 
discourage an employee from taking a job with a competitor.  After 
retaining the employee, the employer then fails to honor its promise.  
If the employee can prove damages—for example, that the other job 
was higher paying or provided additional benefits—then a cause of 
action in promissory estoppel is supported. 
Promissory estoppel and the recognition of a violation of a 
psychological contract both seek to address the feeling of injustice 
produced by a breach of express or implied promises.  The essence of 
psychological contract theory is that even if there is no breach of a 
 
145 See John Paul Kotter, The Psychological Contract: Managing the Joining-Up 
Process, 15 CAL. MGMT. REV. 91, 92 (1973). 
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
147 Id.  See generally Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The 
Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981) (analyzing the 
Restatement’s embrace of detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel). 
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legal employment contract, the breach of a psychological contract 
may result in injustice or at least a perception of injustice.  Feelings of 
injustice are likely to elicit an emotional reaction and lead to 
employee actions against the employer.148  From an employer 
perspective, it is in its best interest to recognize this injustice in order 
to prevent it or provide a remedy for the harm caused.  This 
recognition advances the interests of both the employee and the 
employer.  Perceptions of injustice generate costs for the employer, 
such as increased litigation costs, reputational costs, and retaliation 
costs.  In the end, contract law’s principle of promissory estoppel is a 
much better construct on which to base psychological contract theory.  
However, there is a major difference between the two.  Promissory 
estoppel requires the reliance to be reasonable.  The psychological 
contract literature generally does not distinguish between reasonable 
and unreasonable employee perceptions and expectations. 
D.  Norms and Perceptions of Injustice 
From an employer perspective, it is important to discover the 
underlying conditions or factors that influence or predict discharged 
employees’ propensities to act against the firm.  A variety of personal 
characteristics can influence a person’s proclivity toward retaliatory 
behavior, such as beliefs that others are malevolent, an inclination 
toward anger, and general personal anxiety.149  While these behaviors 
may be beyond the reasonable control of the employer, employers can 
influence important factors relevant to an employee’s propensity to 
retaliate.  For example, the employer can construct discharge policies 
that increase the dignity and respect given to the discharged 
employee, increase the awareness of employees of the company’s 
employment policies at the time of entry and during employment, 
provide an “adequate” explanation for the discharge—one grounded 
in the notion of substantive fairness—, and use due process 
mechanisms leading up to the termination.150 
Our study showed that the fairness norm underlies the feelings of 
injustice that an employee feels at the time of termination.  The study 
indicates that procedural fairness and substantive fairness are 
 
148 See Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 250 (distinguishing between perceived 
breach and violation). 
149 See Eisenberger et al., supra note 11, at 788. 
150 Benjamin B. Dunford & Dennis J. Devine, Employment At-Will and Employee 
Discharge: A Justice Perspective on Legal Action Following Termination, 51 PERSONNEL 
PSYCHOL. 903, 922 (1998). 
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predictors of employees’ actions at termination relating to intent to 
sue or retaliate.  A combination of the two forms of fairness amplified 
the predictive power of employees’ reactions.  The unanswered 
question is whether the employer’s fairness needs to be genuine to be 
effective.  Professor Greenberg labels the manipulation of fairness as 
an act of “hollow justice.”151  He comments that the problem with 
such a divergence is that “[a] perceived intentional ‘using’ of fairness 
as a tool of manipulation is likely to backfire.”152  It would seem that 
the effectiveness of manipulated fairness is dependent on the quality 
of the manipulation.  However, perceptions of fairness, like trust and 
loyalty, are affected throughout the course of the employment.  If an 
employee perceives her employer as being unfair, for example, by not 
treating similarly situated employees equally during the course of 
employment, it will be difficult for an employer to manipulate 
fairness factors to change established perceptions of unfairness.  In 
the area of procedural fairness, process is inherently longitudinal in 
nature.  The perception of procedural fairness is based upon the 
fairness of the employer’s practices and policies throughout the 
duration of the employment.  It is difficult to envision that procedural 
fairness at termination can be manipulated to overcome a history of 
procedural unfairness—such as favoritism in promotion and benefits, 
inequitable application of company policies and practices, and not 
providing the means for the employee to succeed. 
Finally, substantive fairness is more subject to manipulation than 
procedural fairness.  The perception that the employer has a good-
faith reason for the termination, especially those tied to external 
factors like the economy, explains its predictive power over rates of 
litigation and retaliation.  However, if procedural fairness is not 
provided, it is likely that the employee will see the good-faith reason 
as a sham masking an arbitrary or bad-faith dismissal.  The fact that 
the study showed an amplified effect when procedural and substantive 
fairness are both present supports the premise that the two forms of 
fairness are interrelated, at least in the area of employment 
termination. 
 
151 GREENBERG, supra note 116, at 132–33. 
152 Id. 
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V 
KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTIONS, AND EXPECTATIONS 
This Part examines the role of knowledge, perceptions, and 
expectations in the election by an employee to litigate or retaliate.  It 
first analyzes the interrelationship between an employee’s perceptions 
of employment law and the fairness of the employer’s action to 
terminate.  This Part then examines the concept of the internal versus 
external employment relationship.  It concludes with an assessment of 
the ability of best practices to condition employee expectations and 
perceptions. 
A.  Employees’ Perceptions of Employment Law and Employer 
Fairness 
Employees’ expectations relating to job security and the 
employer’s rights to terminate may actually be formed prior to the 
commencement of employment.  The focus here is on the perceptions 
of employment law that employees possess a priori and whether those 
perceptions can be changed at the commencement of employment.  
Fortunately, there are empirical studies that have provided insight into 
employee perceptions of the protections provided under employment 
law.153  The key finding is that employees perceive that the law 
provides protection against arbitrary or unfair discharge.154  Implied 
in these perceptions is the belief that an employer may only discharge 
an employee for just cause.155  These perceptions are patently false 
yet continue to persist.  The most plausible explanation for this 
divergence between perception and reality is provided by behavioral 
decision theory.  It has been shown that most individuals possess a 
number of biases and heuristic tools that they bring to most 
relationships, such as marriage, contract relationships, and 
employment relationships.156 
Pauline Kim showed that employees’ perception of employment 
law is deeply flawed.157  Kim’s study measured the beliefs that 
 
153 E.g., Kim, supra note 69. 
154 Id. at 106. 
155 Id. at 136. 
156 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
1, 3–9 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (reviewing list of biases and heuristics); Christine Jolls 
et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 13 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
157 Kim, supra note 69, at 137. 
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former employees have about the protections provided by 
employment law.158  Kim challenged the assumption that the simple 
concept of employment at will was easily understood and 
acknowledged by employees.159  Kim found that most employees 
believed that the law granted far greater protection from discharge 
than was actually provided.160 
For example, although the common law rule clearly permits an 
employer to terminate an at-will employee out of personal dislike, 
so long as no discriminatory motive is involved, an overwhelming 
majority of the respondents—89%—erroneously believe that the 
law forbids such a discharge. . . .  [T]his study raises serious doubts 
about whether workers have the most basic information necessary 
for understanding the terms on which they have contracted.161 
Similarly, another study reported that 57.8% of participants 
believed that employment at will cannot be legally practiced even if 
job applicants sign an employment agreement which expressly states 
the employment-at-will nature of the relationship.162  Another found 
that “[o]nly 15 percent of the under 35 age group; 22 percent of the 
35–49 age group; eight percent of the 50–65 age group, and 20 
percent of the over 65 age group knew that employers hold the right 
to terminate [employment] at any time even without cause.”163  As 
one author concludes, “Survey results confirm the presence of a 
Pollyannish denial factor in which most respondents believe 
employees can be legally discharged only for cause.”164  These 
beliefs persist out of employees’ desire to construct a coherent and 
secure reality.165  Employees’ misconceptions are likely anchored by 
a fairness norm that equates unfairness with illegality.  An 
employee’s beliefs are shaped by the understanding of employees in 
 
158 Id. at 133–40. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 140. 
161 Id. at 110–11. 
162 Robert F. Wayland et al., Employment-at-Will Statements: Perceptions of Job 
Applicants, 14 INT’L J. MANPOWER 22, 28 (1993). 
163 Frank S. Forbes & Ida M. Jones, A Comparative, Attitudinal, and Analytical Study of 
Dismissal of At-Will Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. L.J. 157, 165 (1986).  The study 
further noted that ninety-three percent, ninety-one percent, eighty-six percent, and eighty-
five percent in the respective age groups found the practice unethical.  Id. 
164 James Wallihan, The Politics of Employee Discharge: Triggering, Representation, 
and Venue, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 625, 630 (2003). 
165 Mark V. Roehling & Wendy R. Boswell, “Good Cause Beliefs” in an “At-Will 
World”? A Focused Investigation of Psychological Versus Legal Contracts, 16 EMP. 
RESPS. & RTS. J. 211, 215 (2004)). 
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general.  For example, the notion that an employer must give a 
minimum of two weeks’ notice before discharge is widely held 
among workers.166  The implication of these results is that discharged 
employees often believe they are victims of an unfair and illegal act. 
Other predispositions that inflate employees’ perceptions of job 
security and just-cause employment include “optimism bias”167 and 
the “availability heuristic.”168  Optimism bias irrationally discounts 
the likelihood of something harmful happening to the particular 
individual.  Employees enter into a job much like people enter into 
marriages, optimistic of the long-term nature of the relationship.  
Important information such as divorce rates or the high instances of 
downsizing or outsourcing is generally discounted.  People tend to 
believe that divorce or termination of employment is likely to happen 
to others but is unlikely to happen to them. 
The availability heuristic can affect an employee’s perceptions by 
inflating either expectations of job security or job insecurity.  If an 
employee’s past experiences support the feeling of job security, such 
as knowing people who retired after long terms of service with a 
single company (especially if the retired individual worked for the 
employee’s current employer), then the employee will underestimate 
the risk of termination.  If the employee has experienced numerous 
discharges, possibly working as a temporary worker, then the risk of 
being terminated will be arbitrarily inflated. 
The optimism bias and the availability heuristic can work together 
to inflate employee expectations.  A new graduate who possesses a 
very positive view of her first employer’s commitment to long-term 
relationships and who knows others inside or outside the company 
that have experienced long-term employment is likely to have an 
irrational set of expectations of employment longevity. 
The present survey measured whether providing employees with 
information regarding the law of employment, namely the 
employment-at-will principle, reduced or increased the rate of 
 
166 Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 63 (2010). 
167 See Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics 
Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 
461 (2004) (“Evidence of the overconfidence (or optimism) bias demonstrates that, on 
average, decision makers underestimate the likelihood of a bad event happening to 
them.”). 
168 See id. at 462 (“If a decision maker uses the availability heuristic . . . his estimate of 
a risk will depend on the extent to which an example of the risk coming to pass comes 
easily to mind.”). 
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litigation and retaliation.  We hypothesized that the more information 
relating to the lack of protections under at-will employment 
relationships the employer provided to the employee upon 
commencement of employment, the lesser the rate of litigation and 
retaliation at discharge.  The overall hypothesis that such education 
lowers rates of litigation and retaliation was confirmed. 
The educating scenario provided the same information as the 
cueing scenario but provided additional information stressing the 
employment-at-will nature of the employment.  In the educating 
variation, the company’s lawyer referred the new employee to an 
express disclaimer clause on the cover of the employee handbook.  
The disclaimer clause explicitly stated that the employer is giving no 
assurances as to job security and that the employer: “RETAINS ALL 
RIGHTS TO DISCHARGE YOU AT ANY TIME, FOR ANY 
REASON, AND WITHOUT NOTICE.”169 
As was expected, the participants that were provided with no 
information showed the highest rate of willingness to litigate and 
retaliate.  Once again, as expected, those who were educated showed 
a lesser rate of ligation and retaliation propensities than those who 
were provided no information.  Therefore, additional information on 
employment at will deflated the employee’s presumption or 
expectation that the law provides protection against unfair or arbitrary 
dismissals.  The survey showed that simply cueing reduced the rate of 
retaliation only slightly (statistically insignificant), while a fuller 
education provided a more dramatic decrease in the rate of retaliation. 
A number of conclusions may be derived from these findings.  
First, they show that employees are able to process legal information 
if properly presented to them.  The internalization of the true meaning 
of employment at will is not so much the product of an express 
disclaimer provision, but the clear explanation of its meaning.  While 
the cueing scenario provided a brief description of the basic principle 
of employment at will and its two exceptions, the educating went into 
greater detail as to the fact that the employee’s particular employment 
was at will. 
It may be true that the content and depth of the information 
provided to the employee could trigger different responses at the time 
of termination.  Behavioral decision theory indicates that individuals 
who are provided too much information actually do a poorer job of 
processing that information than those who are provided less 
 
169 See infra Appendix A § 3.3. 
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information.170  Bounded rationality recognizes the limits of 
individual cognitive processes.171  One scholar notes that, even in 
cases of express disclaimers that the employment is at will, 
“employees do not process employers’ words and conduct as the law 
presumes they do.”172  Oftentimes individuals use shortcuts or are 
biased in some way.173 
The educating scenario in the current study failed to reach the 
limits of bounded rationality.  The survey showed that many of the 
new employees were able to process a definitive explanation of at-
will disclaimers.  This diminished the effects caused by lack of 
knowledge of the law, optimism bias, and the availability heuristic.  
More finely grained surveys will need to be undertaken to measure 
how the differences in the information provided—the language used 
and how it is presented—will best lower employee perceptions and 
expectations of job security.  The current study provides a starting 
point by proving that additional information regarding employment at 
will reduces rates of litigation and retaliation at the time of 
termination. 
Ultimately, the fairness rationale is a more dominant predictor than 
education and cognitive shortcuts like optimism bias, availability 
heuristics, and bounded rationality.  This is what Christine Jolls has 
called the “fairness dynamic.”174  Behavioral decision theory 
recognizes the notion of bounded self-interest in which “people who 
are the beneficiaries of fair behavior tend to reciprocate such behavior 
even when” it is at a cost to themselves.175  She notes “the significant 
role . . . this aspect of fairness behavior [plays] in the employment 
relationship.”176  Fairness considerations are particularly important in 
employment because of its relational aspects.  That is why a breach of 
the psychological contract can trigger a sense of violation and a 
perception of profound unfairness. 
In the end, the issues of disclosure, knowledge, and fairness are 
interrelated factors.  The importance of notice or disclosure to 
 
170 The inability to process information is part of what is referred to as “bounded 
rationality.”  Jolls et al., supra note 156, at 14–15. 
171 Id. 
172 Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does 
It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 7 (2002). 
173 See Jolls et al., supra note 156, at 14–15. 
174 Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law, and Employee Benefits, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 47, 48 (2002). 
175 Id. 
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promote the goals of informed consent177 and fairness is found 
throughout the legal literature.178  The survey showed that some 
advance notice of the “dangers” of employment at will and the use of 
procedural and substantive fairness practices mitigate feelings of 
injustice at the time of termination resulting in reduced rates of 
litigation and retaliation.  Although not measured in the present 
survey, it can be conjectured that disclosure at the commencement of 
employment is positively related to perceptions of fairness at the time 
of discharge.  This effect was likely captured in the measuring of 
procedural fairness and its positive relationship with reduced rates of 
litigation and retaliation.  In the procedural fairness scenarios, the 
employee was referred to the employee manual, which is generally 
given at the commencement of employment, to determine whether she 
had been treated fairly. 
In sum, disclosure, knowledge of the law, the nature of the 
relationship, and fairness factors are powerful predictors of employee 
reaction at the time of termination.  All of those elements are within 
the control of the employer.  As a best practice, a self-interested 
employer should implement practices that increase the level of 
information provided to the employee, including disclosures of the 
nature of the employment relationship and practices of procedural and 
substantive fairness. 
B.  Employer Perceptions: Internal-External Employment Contracts 
Given the longstanding position of the termination-at-will 
employment regime, a common perception is that employers operate 
under the assumption that they can dismiss employees at any time, 
even if oral assurances or a corporate culture of job security exists.  
An argument in favor of such an assumption is that employers 
consciously frame the external contract as one of at-will employment.  
This is evident by the use of disclaimer clauses in employee 
handbooks that expressly preserve the at-will nature of the 
relationship.  At the same time, during the course of employment, the 
 
177 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: 
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 37 (1984) (reporting 
a study that found that fairness perceptions were partially determined based on whether the 
mediation was undertaken by consent of the parties). 
178 See, e.g., Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or at Least Understand Why 
You Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce 
Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM  J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491 (2009) 
(proposing a method to inform prospective owners of closely held businesses of the 
dangers of oppression for minority owners in such businesses). 
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employer fosters an employer-employee relationship more compatible 
to a just-cause relationship.  It is this divergence that is the root of the 
problems affecting employment termination.  First, the internal 
contract or relationship (psychological contract) elevates employees’ 
expectations of job security and broadens their definition of unfair 
dismissal.  Second, when confronted with the external or legal 
contract, the reality of the internal or psychological relationship 
results in irrationally high levels of litigious and retaliatory behavior.  
The irrationality of pursuing litigation despite the lack of legal rights 
is explained by the elevated expectations stemming from the internal 
relationship.  Lack of legal rights aside, the employee is likely to feel 
a sense of betrayal.  This betrayal rests upon the feeling that the 
employer intentionally misrepresented the nature of the relationship 
and therefore is deserving of punishment. 
If the employer’s perception of employment is one of a totally at-
will relationship, then why does the employer feel the need to insert 
such disclaimers and frame the evidentiary case for at-will 
termination?  The answer is difficult to provide other than through 
circular reasoning.  At the high point of the at-will employment law 
regime, the courts were monolithic in their application of the at-will 
termination rights of the employer.  The fact that employment law 
evolved out of what was called master-servant law indicates the 
dominant position of the employer over the employment relationship.  
Employee perceptions of dismissal rights were more likely pro-
employer.  In short-term employment, workers have no illusion of job 
security.  In long-term employment, the expectations of job security 
generally matched the reality of the mid-twentieth-century workplace. 
Toward the later part of the last century, with the breakdown of 
lifetime employment as the norm, the perception of job security began 
to diverge with the reality of the new economy, including volatile 
fluctuations in company sizes and increased employee mobility.  The 
result was a divergence between the employee perception of job 
security and the realities of job insecurity.  The seminal cases 
involving the creation of at-will exceptions were largely due to this 
divergence.  The foundation of a winning case generally involved 
gross instances of procedural and substantive unfairness.  Some courts 
began to feel that the use of the at-will right of employers was 
resulting in injustices that the law could no longer ignore.  This was 
especially true in the discharge of long-time employees. 
As the law moved to prevent injustices in employment discharge, 
employers took steps to reinforce the external at-will contract through 
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disclaimer clauses and carefully worded employee handbooks and 
company policies.  It may also be the case that this reinforcement of 
the external employment contract is a result of changes in employer 
perceptions of the absoluteness of the at-will doctrine.  This is 
supported by the case law in states that recognize an implied-in-fact 
relationship of just-cause employment created subsequent to the 
commencement of an at-will relationship.179  What we are currently 
witnessing, with the creation of employment-at-will exceptions, is a 
merger of the external legal contract with the internal psychological 
contract.  Ultimately, the merger of the psychological contract with 
employment law is possible through the law’s recognition of a public 
policy of “protecting the core bargains struck by employers and 
employees against the opportunism that sequential performance 
risks.”180  Under such recognition, the employee would still have to 
prove that there was an express or implicit promise of job security or 
of an employee-protective process before termination.  Proving the 
existence of a promise or policy of job security shifts the evidentiary 
burden to the employer through a presumption in favor of the 
reasonable employee’s expectations of the nature of the employment 
relationship. 
C.  Perceptions, Expectations, and Best Practices 
Morrison and Robinson have shown that not all breaches of the 
psychological contract produce the same type of employee 
response.181  They distinguish two types of employee perceptions: 
perceived breach and violation.182  This distinction is based on the 
view that perceived breach is cognitive in nature and the sense of 
violation is emotive in nature.183  It is the second type of breach that 
produces the strongest response—higher rates of litigation and 
retaliation.184  Morrison and Robinson assert that perceived breach is 
a precursor to feelings of violation.185  But not all perceived breaches 
 
179 Professor Estreicher notes, “For employers, there are a sufficient number of 
exceptions from the at-will rule . . . that it may be the wisest course to assume that 
virtually all employment decisions will be subject to legal scrutiny.”  Samuel Estreicher, 
Human Behavior and the Economic Paradigm at Work, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). 
180 Moss, supra note 4, at 343–44. 
181 Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 247–48. 
182 Id. at 230. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 230–31. 
185 Id. at 230. 
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produce the affective state that a sense of violation produces.186  They 
elaborate, “[V]iolation is a combination of disappointment emotions 
and anger emotions.”187  A combination of these emotions leads to a 
feeling of betrayal, which in turn results in “a mental state of 
readiness for action.”188  Another explanation of this phenomenon is 
the concept of bounded willpower taken from behavioral decision 
theory.189  A breach that rises to the level of a violation may 
challenge the dismissed employee’s exercise of self-control relating to 
retaliatory responses. 
The Morrison and Robinson study provides insight into how 
occurrences of perceived violations can be minimized.  It 
distinguishes between obligations that the employer is unable to keep 
versus those that the employer is unwilling to keep.  If the reason for 
the breach is the former, then one could expect that the employee’s 
reaction would be less emotive.  The second type of breach is likely 
due to the incongruence between employer and employee 
expectations.190  Incongruence is due to differences in the ability to 
process information regarding the employment relationship—
factoring in differences in cognitive and analytical abilities, as well as 
the complexity and ambiguity of the obligations.  That results in 
different interpretations of the psychological contract, which is 
significant for a theory of best practices.  The employer can reduce 
the degree of incongruence and thus diminish the rate of perceptions 
of violation by clear and continuous communication with its 
employees.  Communication or full disclosure of obligations reduces 
the occurrences of the emotive state of violation, which reduces rates 
of litigation and retaliation.  In addition, the law generally recognizes 
disclosure as a defense to perceived breaches of contract or claims of 
misrepresentation.191 
 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 231. 
188 Id. 
189 Jolls et al., supra note 156, at 15–16. 
190 Morrison and Robinson tie the development of incongruence to a number of factors: 
(1) “divergent schemata” (the employer and employee may have different cognitive 
frameworks for interpreting or processing information), (2) “complexity” (the employee is 
provided a large number of stimuli that he or she has difficulty in processing, storing, and 
recalling), (3) “ambiguity” (ambiguous stimuli require the employee to construe and to fill 
in gaps using contextual factors and prior information).  Morrison & Robinson, supra note 
57, at 235–36. 
191 FARNSWORTH, supra note 143, § 4.11, at 247.  “Courts have departed from or 
relaxed the ‘no duty to disclose’ rule by carving out exceptions to the rule and by refusing 
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In line with Morrison and Robinson, other research has shown that 
employer communications regarding employment terms and 
conditions can affect perceptions of fairness and trust.  This research 
hypothesizes that the more explicit the employer is regarding the 
terms of the employment, the greater the level of fairness and trust 
produced.192  David Guest and Neil Conway also found that 
information communicated at the recruitment, personal, or grassroots 
level is more effective than top-down communication in effectuating 
perceptions of fairness.193 
If a company fosters a “good company” persona to recruit and to 
increase productivity, then the perceptions it fosters lay a basis for 
claims of injustice.  This produces a somewhat counterintuitive 
suggestion that a company’s best practice to preserve an absolute 
right to terminate at will is to foster an image of being a “bad 
company.”  In this way, employees’ perceptions of just-cause 
termination rights will be greatly diminished.  The problem, of 
course, is that the employer loses the benefits of the good company 
persona in the areas of recruitment, productivity, and employee 
loyalty.  The benefit of a good company reputation, especially in a 
mobile workforce, is the primary reason for the divergence of the 
internal and external employment contracts.  Alternatively stated, the 
bad company will need to compensate through higher wages and 
benefits to attract competent workers.  The ability to buy loyalty is 
difficult to determine.  In the end, the benefits of a good company 
persona outweigh the costs of buttressing a strictly at-will perception 
of the employment relationship. 
This survey supports the notion that the best avenue is for the 
employer to be a smart-good employer.  A smart-good employer 
captures the benefits of the good company persona while putting in 
place practices that diminish the perceptions of injustice at the time of 
employee termination.  Based on the survey findings, best practices 
would include (1) educating employees as to the external or legal 
contract, (2) implementing practices that buttress its good company 
persona while not changing the at-will status of the relationship, and 
(3) emphasizing substantive and procedural fairness factors leading 
up to and including the time of termination.  Educating employees, 
 
to adhere to the rule when it works an injustice.”  Id. (citing Ollerman v. O’Rourke Co., 
288 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Wis. 1980)). 
192 David E. Guest & Neil Conway, Communicating the Psychological Contract: An 
Employer Perspective, 12 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. J. 22, 25–26 (2002). 
193 Id. at 35. 
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good company practices, and fairness can be seen as part of a 
progression, with the fairness norm playing the guiding role.  The 
fairness norm rationalizes educating as providing fuller disclosure to 
the employee.  If properly manipulated, these best practices will allow 
the employer to frame employee perceptions that the employer’s acts 
of fairness are done because it is a good company and not because it 
is legally required.  As a good company, it provides for the well-being 
of the employee, not because it is legally required to treat employees 
fairly, but because it cares.  The fairness norm undergirds the 
practices employed during the employment engagement to emphasize 
that an employee’s failure to succeed is due to the employee’s 
shortcomings and not due to any malicious motive of the employer.  
Finally, the fairness norm is most useful when it guides employer 
actions leading up to and including the time of termination.  The goal 
here is to manage the employee’s perceptions of the fairness of the 
discharge by framing the employee’s perceptions throughout the 
course of the employment. 
The survey supports a theory of best practices that use knowledge, 
practices, and perceptions to merge the legal contract with the 
psychological contract.  It recognizes that the merger in the good 
company model will never be complete unless the company adopts a 
just-cause-termination employment regime.  But it also recognizes 
that the costs, in terms of litigation and retaliation attached to the 
strong application of the at-will termination rule, can be mitigated 
through the use or framing of the internal contract. 
Finally, the harm caused by termination, especially those that are 
viewed as a breach of the psychological contract, harms not only the 
discharged employee but also the surviving employees.194  The 
employer should take steps to minimize the effect of discharge on 
others in the organization.195  Failure to pursue substantive and 
procedural fairness or to disclose relevant information during the 
process of termination is likely to affect remaining employees and 
their view of the psychological contract.  There is the fear that an 
unfair firing will be internalized by remaining employees as a 
violation of their expectations of job security.  One possible result is 
the diminishment of trust between the remaining employees and the 
employer.  One study showed that trust can mediate the perceptions of 
 
194 Jean M. Hiltrop, Managing the Changing Psychological Contract, 18 EMP. REL. 36, 
44 (1996). 
195 Id. 
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psychological contract breach and the negative outcomes of perceived 
breaches.196  Just as the perception of fairness during the course of an 
employment relationship can reduce negative outcomes, trust building 
early in the relationship can minimize negative effects stemming from 
subsequent breaches.  The feedback loop noted above can weaken the 
strength of prior trust. 
VI 
FUTURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT AND EMPLOYMENT 
LAW 
The common law is in a constant state of development.  The major 
force behind its development is the correcting of injustices that occur 
within its domain.  The common law of contract focuses upon the 
intent of a promising party and the expectations of a promise-
receiving party.  In the classic contract-law paradigm, there are 
reciprocal intents, promises, and expectations.  Promissory estoppel is 
an example in which contract law responds to injustices when the 
reciprocal exchange of promises is missing.  In some cases, a singular 
promise is seen to cause an injustice through the creation of 
reasonable or detrimental reliance.  In the employment-at-will 
scenario, the psychological contract serves to expose the injustice 
caused by employer-generated expectations of job security and fair 
dismissal.  Just as contract law fabricated promissory estoppel to 
prevent injustice, in the case of the breach of reasonable expectations 
in the employment context, the expectations found in the 
psychological contract can be used to fashion an employee remedy. 
This Part first reviews the factors that create the psychological 
contract: the power of context, the role of education, the role of 
fairness, and the role of a priori expectations.  It also suggests 
avenues for future research in those four areas.  Finally, it examines 
the evolution of employment-at-will exceptions and the role of the 
psychological contract in that evolution, looking to the future of 
employment law by using the psychological contract as a means of 
reforming employment law.  The malleability and flexibility of 
contract law provide the means of closing the gap between a legal 
employment obligation and a psychological contract obligation.  The 
rationales for such a change are the broader recognition and 
protection of reasonable expectations. 
 
196 See Sandra L. Robinson, Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract, 41 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 574 (1996). 
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A.  The Power of Context 
Greenberg argues that it is important to analyze justice in the 
workplace by the application of specific issues to different 
contexts.197  Context in the employment realm can be divided into 
internal and external contexts.  The internal context is represented by 
the firm itself and how it relates to its employees.  A corporate culture 
and socialization into that culture are examples of phenomena found 
in the internal context.  The common feature of the elements that 
make up the internal context is that they are all within the control of 
the employer.  If done properly, the internal context can be a tool for 
minimizing the degree of incongruence between employer and 
employee expectations.  Another example of internal context is the 
work context itself.  For example, prior bad work experiences within 
the company may result in organizational cynicism.  This 
organizational cynicism becomes part of the internal context of the 
psychological contract.  One study confirmed the cyclical nature of 
psychological contract breach and organizational cynicism.198  
Specifically, employees who believed that the firm’s promises were 
broken held more cynical attitudes toward their employer.199 
The external or legal context is generally outside the control of the 
employer.  However, the employer can influence how the employee 
interfaces with or perceives the external contract.  Employers face 
three challenging conditions concerning their ability to control the 
appearance of fairness in the termination of employees.  First, due to 
economic and financial conditions, employers may be limited in their 
ability to create a stable and secure employment environment.  
Second, employees’ beliefs that the law protects them from unfair or 
arbitrary discharge are likely to persist at some level.  Third, 
employees now have a larger menu of legal remedies with which to 
punish employers for unfair decisions than they had in the past.  The 
result is a situation where employers perceive themselves to be under 
constant threat of litigation or retaliation from discharged 
employees.200  More research needs to be done to determine the ways 
 
197 GREENBERG, supra note 116, at 401.  Morrison and Robinson also note that there is 
“considerable variance across occupations, organizations, industries, and countries with 
respect to the number and types of obligations that exist between employees and 
organizations.”  Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 249. 
198 Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, supra note 42, at 641–42. 
199 Id. 
200 Cf. Rita Murphy, OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection for Aviation Workers, 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 901, 914–15 (2004) (discussing whistleblower protection and noting 
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an employer can frame the internal context of a relationship to combat 
the larger societal and legal context that encourages employee 
litigation and retaliation.201 
A number of studies have noted the “changed world” of 
employment.  Morrison and Robinson note that “assurance of job 
security and steady rewards in return for hard work and loyalty no 
longer exist in most cases.”202  Although such assurances may not be 
as forthcoming from employers, employees’ expectations of job 
security are more likely to resist such a radical shift in the 
employment relationship.  Optimism bias supports the employees’ 
positive opinion of their employment relationship and their ability to 
obtain job security.  More study is needed to measure the persistence 
of employee expectations despite a change in context at the macro 
level. 
Previously, it was noted that the psychological contract is a bundle 
of many matched and unmatched expectations.  Due to that 
complexity and the uncertainty of the market for job security, the 
divergence of employer and employee expectations is likely to widen 
in the short term.203  The increase in the incongruence of expectations 
necessarily increases the rate at which employees perceive employers’ 
violations of the psychological contract.204  However, a feedback loop 
may eventually lower employees’ expectations that make up the 
psychological contract.  It would seem that if an employer 
consistently violates the psychological contract, this pattern of 
violations should feed back to its employees.  The feedback should 
reduce employees’ expectations and thereby diminish the scope and 
strength of the psychological contract. 
 
that because of its protections and low burdens of proof, “disgruntled or troublemaking 
employees may find it easier to file frivolous complaints and engage in needless litigation 
with hopes of increasing costs for employers and getting revenge”). 
201 Rousseau notes, “Firms foster different psychological contracts by the way they 
reward their employees and the HRM strategies that underly [sic] personnel practices.”  
Denise M. Rousseau, New Hire Perceptions of Their Own and Their Employer’s 
Obligations: A Study of Psychological Contracts, 11 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 389, 
399 (1990). 
202 Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 226. 
203 One study showed “that among a sample of recent MBA graduates, 55% believed 
that some aspect of their psychological contracts had been broken by their employers 
during the previous two years.”  Id. (citing Robinson & Rousseau, supra note 67). 
204 See Robinson & Rousseau, supra note 67. 
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B.  The Role of Education 
Our survey showed that providing employees with information 
about the nature of employment law and their particular relationship 
relates to their perceptions of fairness.  As noted earlier, more finely 
grained research should further explore the relationship between 
employee knowledge of employment at will and the persistent beliefs 
in the existence of rights that protect against other than just-cause 
termination.  Would a more in-depth explanation of employee rights 
than presented in this survey produce better results in further reducing 
the rates of litigation and retaliation?  Would other practices in 
framing those rights, such as annual re-education, produce better 
results?  Would too much information overwhelm employees’ 
cognitive abilities, leading them back to the use of heuristics 
(availability, fairness) and biases (optimism)? 
C.  The Role of Fairness 
The fairness norm is the most robust predictor of an employee’s 
reaction at the time of termination.205  If there is a perception of 
unfairness, there is more likely a perception that the termination was 
unjust.  A feeling of injustice is the strongest rationale for an 
employee’s perception of a violation as opposed to a merely cognitive 
recognition of breach.  The sense of violation produces the emotive 
response most likely to result in litigation and retaliation by the 
employee.  More research is needed to see how the fairness norm can 
be used to lower employee feelings of violation and help merge the 
legal and psychological contracts.  In the area of the impact of 
procedural and substantive fairness, the avenues for future research 
are many.  A number of them became apparent in undertaking the 
current survey.  Because the current study focused on substantive-
procedural fairness at the time of termination, an extended look at 
procedural and substantive fairness at the time of hire and throughout 
the employment relationship should be undertaken to see how that 
history frames the perceptions of fairness at discharge.  If the 
 
205 The perception of fairness or unfairness has been acknowledged as a prime 
motivator of human behavior.  See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF 
JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND 
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 59 (1989) (“Litigants were more satisfied with the 
outcome . . . and perceived the procedures to be fairer when the outcome exceeded their 
expectations . . . .”); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. 
L. REV. 753, 753–54 (2004) (asserting the fairness perceptions are the key factors to 
understanding negotiating behaviors). 
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employee views her employer as generally unfair, does that provide a 
framing bias or availability heuristic that is likely to result in a 
negative response even in instances where the discharge is both 
procedurally and substantively fair?  Are there ways for the employer 
to reframe or overcome such biases prior to discharge? 
Another study could try to measure the long-term effects on 
perceptions of a variety of procedural and substantive fairness 
practices.  In the procedural or process realm, the role of performance 
reviews, the frequency of reviews, and whether the employee 
perceives the evaluations as merit based or based upon inappropriate 
factors must be researched.  Additionally, a survey should test how 
employees’ perceptions of the goodness or badness of their 
relationships with the reviewers or evaluators impact employees’ 
intentions to litigate or retaliate at the time of discharge.  Other 
factors that should be measured include the role of mentoring, the role 
of providing ample notice regarding changes in the terms and 
conditions of employment, the perceptions of equality or inequality in 
the application of company policies,206 and whether these perceptions 
substantially influence the employee’s reactions at the time of 
termination. 
D.  The Role of A Priori Expectations 
The current study also did not make any distinctions between the 
impact of long-term employment and the development of firm-
specific skill sets, and shorter lengths of employment and the 
development of marketable skills sets.207  It has generally been 
conjectured that such factors go to the core of employee expectations 
and influence an employee’s feelings of injustice at the time of 
termination.  From the perspective of law, this leads to a host of 
 
206 In an examination of the effect of corporate mission statements on organizational 
decision making, one study asked in relationship to employees, “Do firms practice what 
they preach in their mission?”  The answer was “no.”  Barbara R. Bartkus & Myron 
Glassman, Do Firms Practice What They Preach?: The Relationship Between Mission 
Statements and Stakeholder Management, in LEADING ORGANIZATIONS: PERSPECTIVES 
FOR A NEW ERA 297, 305 (Gill Robinson Hickman ed., 2d ed. 2010).  The authors did 
indicate that despite the failure to practice what they preach, the incorporation of the 
employee as a stakeholder in the mission statement serves a symbolic purpose: 
“[E]veryone feels a little better when included in the mission statement, even with full 
knowledge that their inclusion does not really make a difference.”  Id. 
207 Sherry E. Sullivan & Lisa Mainiero, Women’s Kaleidoscope Careers: A New 
Framework for Examining Women’s Stress Across the Lifespan, in EXPLORING THE WORK 
AND NON-WORK INTERFACE 205, 214 (Pamela L. Perrewé & Daniel C. Ganster eds., 
2007). 
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questions.  The length of employment and acquisition of firm-specific 
skills creates the problem of employee vulnerability and economic 
dependence.  Should the law provide added protections for 
employees, or should the employer owe a heightened duty to long-
term employees?  If long-term employees are less marketable, does 
the employer have a duty to provide retraining opportunities?  It is 
unlikely that the law will recognize such a duty anytime soon.  
However, the answer is clearer if approached from the perspective of 
ethics or morality.  Psychologist Carol Gilligan’s study of female 
moral development led to a school of ethics called the “ethics of 
care.”208  Under such an approach, an employer does owe a greater 
duty of care toward long-term employees.  Implied in such 
relationships are the norms of loyalty and trust as well as factors of 
dependence and mobility.  Gilligan labels these “concrete 
relationships.”209 
A more in-depth study should measure the impacts along a 
continuum of mostly a priori employee expectations on rates of 
litigation and retaliation.  An employee with expectations of short-
term employment that are based upon the employee’s belief that the 
job will be a stepping stone to a better job at another company may 
still have feelings of injustice at termination.  What effect does the 
timing of the termination (prior to skill acquisition, during skill 
acquisition, or after skill acquisition) have on such an employee at the 
time of termination?  What is the effect of the employee’s feelings 
that the company’s skill training is of lesser quality than expected?  
What is the effect of the failure of the employee’s expected career 
path, such as having to stay with the company for a longer than 
expected period, on the employee’s feelings at termination? 
 
208 E.g., Tally Kritzman-Amir, Looking Behind the “Protection Gap”: The Moral 
Obligation of the State to Necessitous Immigrants, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 47, 80 
(2009) (“The ethics of care approach is based on psychological research performed by 
Carol Gilligan, who analyzed the problem-solving attitudes of women and men in the 
hopes of determining whether women have a different “voice”—or approach—than men.  
Gilligan concluded that females apply an ethics of care approach and perceive ethical 
dilemmas in terms of relationships, responsibility, caring, context, and communication.”); 
Karin van Marle, “Meeting the World Halfway”—The Limits of Legal Transformation, 16 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 651, 662 (2004).  See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
209 Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 624 (1990).  
The author explains that one “feminist strategy is to claim that women's distinctive 
attributes promote a distinctive form of understanding. . . .  This line of analysis, 
popularized by Carol Gilligan, argues that women tend to reason in ‘a different voice’; 
they are less likely than men to privilege abstract rights over concrete relationships and are 
more attentive to values of care, connection, and context.”  Id. 
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E.  Employment Law: Past and Future 
This Subpart looks to the past and future of employment law.  It 
suggests that the psychological contract played a role in the 
development of exceptions to the termination-at-will principle.  It 
then recommends that the psychological contract be used as a basis to 
reform employment law in the future.  The merging of the legal and 
psychological employment contracts advances contract law’s goal of 
preventing or remedying contractual injustices.  Employment law 
reform may take the form of a broad recognition of a just-cause 
termination rule.  It is more likely to come through the application of 
existing contract law structures, such as the more expansive use of 
promissory estoppel and contextual interpretation. 
1.  Evolution of At-Will Exceptions and the Psychological Contract 
Despite the lowering of expectations due to the new employment 
marketplace—one characterized by instability and employee 
mobility—psychological contract theory is useful in assessing the 
beliefs and practices of employers, employees, and the legal system.  
It can be conjectured that the implied-in-fact and good-faith 
exceptions were developed in response to breaches of the 
psychological contract.  Fairness and reasonable expectations have a 
long tradition in contract law and at times act as counterweights to 
freedom of contract.210  Contract law adjusts to novel developments 
in business transactions and to changes in societal norms.  As the 
model of lifetime employment began to disintegrate, companies 
provided assurances through employee handbooks, benefit packages, 
and oral promises of job security.  The clash between employee 
expectations and the reality of the employment relationship resulted 
in increased feelings of unfairness and injustice at the time of 
termination.  The courts began to respond to perceived unfairness and 
injustice by crafting exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine. 
General rules or standards of law generally begin as absolutes.  
Eventually, a category of cases questions the justice of the rule when 
it is applied to specific fact patterns.  Judges move to prevent 
systemic injustices by fabricating exceptions to the general rule.  In 
 
210 See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDS 
AND PRINCIPLES (2001) (reviewing the equitable reformation of contracts in the twentieth 
century and the immutability of equitable contract principles); DiMatteo, supra note 126, 
at 444–45 (noting the detachment of underlying norms and contract rules and that the 
fairness norm plays a fundamental role in judicial decision making). 
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utilitarian terms, the benefits of a general rule applied to a general 
area of law or society may be justified.  Over time, however, it 
becomes clear that there are groups of similarly situated cases or fact 
patterns where the general rule produces unjust results.  Rule 
utilitarianism justifies adopting an exception to the rule that yields 
greater benefits than merely applying the general rule across all cases.  
The key element in the rule-utilitarian approach is the importance of a 
category or group.  The law should respond only when there is a well-
defined and sizeable group that justifies an exception or a rule 
adjustment.  If this is not done properly, then the benefits of certainty 
and predictability provided by general rules will be lost. 
Standards such as unconscionability and good faith are different 
than rules.  They serve as metaprinciples that cover potentially all 
contractual relationships.  Their application is done on an ad hoc basis 
because each case is different in some way.  Even though a workable 
definition of good faith may be out of reach, Professor Summers’s 
excluder analysis can assist in determining types of bad faith.211  The 
court in Busam Motor Sales v. Ford Motor Co. described the essence 
of an excluder analysis: “It is possible that it would have shown 
certain acts or course of conduct . . . from which the required bad 
faith could be properly inferred.”212  If such patterns of conduct 
reoccur in a significant number of cases, then those patterns lay the 
foundation for the recognition and application of the duty of good 
faith. 
There is a strong argument that, in a covert way, psychological 
contract theory, or at least the contextual elements that are recognized 
in the theory, lies at the base of the good-faith and implied-in-fact 
exceptions that developed in the law.  The consistent breach of 
employee expectations (psychological contract) allowed courts to 
witness the injustice caused by the shield of the employment-at-will 
doctrine.  It is unlikely that the courts were familiar with the human 
resource management literature, and it is equally unlikely that the 
good-faith or implied-in-fact exceptions were the impetus for 
psychological contract theory.  But both the development of the 
exceptions and of psychological contract theory respond to the same 
sense of injustice caused by the intentional breach of employee 
expectations whether the breach is recognized as a legal breach or 
 
211 Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 28, at 818–24. 
212 203 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1953) (dealing with a termination of an automobile 
franchise). 
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not.213  The exceptions close the gap between the psychological 
contract and the legal contract. 
2.  The Future of Employment Law: Using the Psychological Contract 
to Reform Employment Law 
The harm caused by violations of the psychological contract has 
only partially been recognized in contract and employment law.  This 
harm is never more present than at the time of termination.  
Termination is the most important condition or term of employment 
because it is one in which the employee can no longer adjust 
expectations and actions to preserve the relationship.  The analysis in 
this Article suggests that the employment law of the future should 
take fuller cognizance of the psychological contract.  In sum, both 
contract law and the psychological contract are expectations based.  
Contract law serves to protect the expectancy interests of the 
contracting parties.  The psychological contract focuses on the unmet 
expectations of the employee and the harm caused to them by 
violations of the psychological contract.  The problem is that such 
contracts do not fit into the framework of classical contract law, 
which requires clearness of intent, preference for written agreements, 
and a matching of bilateral expectations.  However, a fuller 
incorporation of relational contract norms in employment termination 
law would narrow the divergence between enforceable employment 
contracts and unenforceable psychological contracts. 
The move to merge the two types of employment contracts is not 
based purely on the employee’s perspective and feelings of 
injustice.214  It is also based on the employer’s role in creating and 
manipulating employee perceptions and expectations relating to the 
job and the intentions of the employer.  In essence, the employer is 
procuring additional benefits (loyalty and productivity) without 
incurring additional costs or providing additional remuneration.  As 
the present study shows, unilateral actions taken by the employer 
(procedural fairness, substantive fairness, and education) influence 
 
213 Professor Estlund notes that because of the gap between the psychological contract 
and a legal contract the employer has it both ways in that it “enjoy[s] the benefits of 
employee expectations of legally enforceable job security without legal accountability.”  
Estlund, supra note 172, at 7. 
214 Professor Estlund suggests closing the gap between psychological contracts and 
legal employment contracts by adopting a waivable default in favor of job security.  Id. at 
8.  This forces the employer to obtain a waiver of job security from her employees.  Id.  
This way, the employer cannot obtain the benefits of employee expectations of job 
security and the legal reality of employment at will.  Id. 
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the reaction of the employee at the time of termination.  If done 
properly, such actions prevent the elevation of a perceived 
psychological breach to the level of a violation, which in turn explains 
the reduced rates of litigation and retaliation.  The study, like all 
empirical studies, is purely descriptive in nature.  It shows that the 
employer may take actions that reduce employee and employer harm.  
The law uses descriptive understandings to convert a “may” into a 
“should” or a “must.”  The “should” response uses the breach of the 
psychological contract as one factor in determining employer liability.  
The “must” response results in the breach of the psychological 
contract being recognized as a breach of a legal contract.  The “must” 
version is best left to legislative regulation of the workplace.  Federal 
and state regulations pervade most employment relationships from 
workplace safety to minimum wage to plant-closing and maternity-
leave laws.  Legislative mandates attempt to provide bright-line rules 
or absolute requirements.  However, courts can more adeptly adopt 
the “should” version.  Given the complexity of the psychological 
contract, recognition of a breach of the psychological contract can be 
utilized as a factor by the courts in determining employer liability. 
A strong reason for reforming employment law to better reflect an 
employee’s sense of injustice at termination is that the employee’s 
sense of injustice is within the employer’s ability to control.  Through 
practices of strict adherence to procedural fairness, including proper 
disclosures and education, the employer can minimize the sense of 
violation and reduce rates of employee-generated litigation.  The law 
can be reformed to recognize these contextual factors and thereby 
reduce the cognitive dissonance of the employee confronting both 
legal and psychological contracts.  The issue of substantive fairness is 
more problematic.  Requiring substantive fairness is likely to require 
a transformation of employment law from at will to just cause.  Short 
of such a radical change, the courts could perform a contextual 
analysis to determine whether the requirement of substantive fairness 
was self-imposed by the employer.  Self-imposition of a just-cause 
requirement can be determined by the employer’s role in building the 
expectations of employees relating to job security and just-cause 
termination.215 
 
215 The practice of procedural fairness is likely to support the employee’s expectations 
of just-cause termination.  See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66–70, 205 (1988) (describing field studies that 
show that greater perceptions of procedural justice generally produce greater perceptions 
of distributive justice, regardless of whether an outcome is positive or negative). 
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The above discussion provides the rationales for the partial 
merging of the legal employment contract with the psychological 
contract.  This merging can be performed within the framework of 
existing law.  The sections below provide ways in which current law 
can be changed to more fully recognize the psychological contract. 
a.  Employment-At-Will Exceptions 
First, the implied-in-fact exception to employment at will should 
be universally recognized.  Elements of the psychological contract 
should be utilized in determining if an implied-in-fact contract has 
been formed. 216  Psychological contracts focus on expectations of the 
employee based upon the employer’s assurances and practices.  
Research in psychological contracts can help understand which 
explicit and implicit statements create the expectation in the 
employee’s mind that an employment contract superseding 
employment at will had been formed.  Not every employee 
expectation should establish a contractual obligation because not 
every employee expectation is reasonable.217  However, inquiry into 
the psychological contract can help illuminate otherwise opaque 
implied promises. 
Second, the same rationale for making the implied-in-fact 
exception more universal supports the claim for expanding the good-
faith exception.  Implied-in-fact contracts capture the moment that 
reasonable employee expectations were created by the employer.  The 
malicious creation of such expectations with the intent to procure 
employee-generated benefits can be captured by application of the 
good-faith exception.  Because the employer is the primary generator 
of such expectations, especially concerning job security, then it 
should be required to meet a threshold of substantive and procedural 
good faith when terminating employees.  Psychological contract 
theory can illuminate employee expectations; it can also help 
understand attitudes.  To understand good faith, one must look to, 
among other sources, the attitudes and communications of the parties 
in their interactions with one another.218  Psychological contract 
 
216 See DiMatteo, supra note 134, at 782 (“It can be argued that the psychological 
contract is akin to the implied-in-fact or good faith duty exceptions to the employer’s right 
to discharge an employee without cause.”); Stone, supra note 56, at 551–52 & n.110. 
217 See Bird, supra note 38, at 208–15. 
218 See, e.g., Burton Kainen & Shel D. Myers, Turning Off the Power on Employees: 
Using Employees’ Surreptitious Tape-Recordings and E-Mail Intrusions in Pursuit of 
Employer Rights, 27 STETSON L. REV. 91, 110 (1997) (“Good faith and fair dealing mean 
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theory can be used to trace employees’ expectations to employer-
employee or manager-employee interactions to support or refute a 
claim of bad faith. 
b.  Promissory Estoppel 
The expansion or more liberal use of promissory estoppel in the 
area of employment discharge makes conceptual sense.219  
Promissory estoppel primarily focuses upon the reasonable 
expectations of the promisee.  The psychological contract literature 
demonstrates that the employee’s expectations of job security and 
employer good faith are substantially related to employer 
representations or to other phenomena within the control of the 
employer, such as organizational culture.  If employee reliance on 
employer-generated expectations is reasonable, then a claim of 
promissory estoppel should be allowed to prevent an injustice to the 
discharged employee.220 
All the requirements of a promissory estoppel claim—promise 
(express or implied), reasonable reliance, and injustice—are present 
in the breach of many psychological contracts at the time of 
termination.  It is important to note that the burden of proof remains 
with the employee.  However, a broader recognition by the courts of 
the psychological contract will lessen the evidentiary burden.  The 
integrity of applying promissory estoppel to the employment 
discharge setting is that it does not require a finding of a contract or a 
bilateral exchange of promises.  It is a justice-based claim found 
within contract law that requires only the giving of promises or 
assurances by one party—the employer.  If the employer is the cause 
of the employee’s expectations, then it should be held accountable if a 
breach of those expectations works an injustice.  In the end, it is not 
whether promissory estoppel is applicable to employment discharge; 
it is whether the courts will be willing to recognize the harm caused 
by violations of the psychological contract.  Such recognition 
 
an attitude or ‘state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to 
defraud, and, generally speaking, being faithful to one's duty or obligation.’”). 
219 See Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the 
Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1999). 
220 Professor Hillman notes “that the theory [of promissory estoppel] should be 
especially significant in the non-union employment setting, where, through their 
communications, employers seek to create the expectation of a stable, secure work 
environment and where, because of their general lack of contractual job security and their 
material and psychological investments in their jobs, employees are prone to rely on these 
messages.”  Id. at 2. 
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provides the evidentiary foothold needed to make a successful 
promissory estoppel claim. 
c.  Tort of Bad Faith and the Good-Faith Exception 
Another potential legal response is found in the tort of bad faith.  
The tort of bad-faith breach was recognized by the California 
Supreme Court in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard 
Oil Co. of California.221  Even though the courts have generally not 
elected to expand the tort of bad faith outside the realm of insurance 
law,222 there is no reason why the tort theoretically cannot be applied 
to any type of contract.  Nonetheless, it has been used primarily 
against insurance companies who fail to pay out legitimate claims in a 
timely fashion.223  The concept of bad-faith breach as enunciated in 
Seaman’s could be applied to bad-faith termination in the 
employment setting.  The Seaman’s court based the claim of bad faith 
on the “special relationship” between the insured and the insurer.224  
The employment relationship should be designated as such a special 
relationship.  The Seaman’s court described the special relationship of 
insured-insurer as “characterized by elements of public interest, 
adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.”225  A strong case can be made 
that the employer owes at least a quasi-fiduciary duty to its employees 
to act in good faith.  The good-faith exception to employment at will 
is fashioned out of the same public policy rationales. 
Just as the tort of bad faith is based on a breach of an implied duty 
in an insurance contract, a tort of bad-faith termination can be 
fabricated based upon an implied duty in the employment context.  
An implied duty requiring good-faith termination would allow a claim 
for bad-faith termination despite the absence of an express 
 
221 686 P.2d 1158, 1170 (Cal. 1984), overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil 
Co., 900 P.2d 669, 670 (Cal. 1995). 
222 The California Supreme Court subsequently rejected the application of the tort of 
bad faith to the employment relationship.  See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 
373, 380 (Cal. 1988) (failing to apply the tort of bad faith to the employee discharge 
scenario); see also E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 
1996) (confining the tort of bad faith to insurance cases). 
223 See Arnold R. Levinson & Terrence J. Coleman, Insurance Bad Faith Claims Are 
Not Preempted, TRIAL, June 2001, at 30, 31 (noting that “many states’ bad faith laws are 
limited exclusively to insurance claims.”).  See generally 16 RICHARD A. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49:104 (4th ed. 
2000). 
224 Seaman’s Direct Buying Service Inc., 686 P.2d at 1666–67. 
225 Id. at 1666. 
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employment contract.226  Instead of requiring a bad-faith breach of a 
legal contract, evidence of breach of the psychological contract can be 
used to prove the bad-faith nature of the termination. 
3.  Summary 
Because employment law is contractually based, the general 
recognition of the good-faith exception would be the more 
conceptually sound manner in which to respond to serious violations 
of the psychological contract.227  We believe that the current study 
supports the more expansive use of the good-faith exception as well 
as the expansion of the tort of bad faith into the employment setting.  
The study showed that it is in the employer’s control to manage the 
employee’s perception of the termination as one of good faith or bad 
faith. 
Given the bold claims of the preceding paragraph, it is important to 
note that we are not suggesting that any breach of the psychological 
contract at the time of termination equates to wrongful discharge.  
This is because not all psychological contract breaches are the same.  
This was alluded to in the literature distinguishing between perceived 
breaches that do, and perceived breaches that do not, rise to the level 
of a violation.  Thus, like contract interpretation,228 whether a breach 
of the psychological contract reaches the level of a breach of a legal 
contract depends on a broad range of contextual factors including 
company representations, policies, and practices; organizational 
culture;229 reasonableness of employee expectations; longevity of 
employment;230 teaching of firm-specific versus marketable skills; 
 
226 Another analogy is the claim of tortious interference with business relations, which 
is not based upon an actual contract breach. 
227 It has been argued that “relational opportunism” used by employers should be held 
in check through the law’s recognition of an “implied covenant of the employment 
relation.”  Bird, supra note 38, at 195–215. 
228 Classical contract law was more formal in the interpretation of contracts limiting 
admissible evidence to the written contract or direct, express communications between the 
parties.  Neoclassical contract law embraces the concept that the meaning of a contract 
cannot be fully known without considering the context in which it was formed.  Relational 
contract law broadens the contextual factors that should be considered in interpreting and 
enforcing contracts. 
229 “Corporate culture has been defined as an internal consistency within an 
organization that influences the behavior and values of its employees.”  Bird, supra note 
38, at 180. 
230 See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and 
Employment at Will, 92 MICH L. REV. 8 (1993).  Furthermore, “employers, particularly 
leaders of a company, have a profound impact upon the development, nature, and 
characteristics of employees’ cultural norms.”  Bird, supra note 38, at 183. 
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and so on.  If the implied-in-fact or good-faith exceptions were fully 
recognized, then the same contextual factors that are prominent in 
psychological contract theory could be used to prove claims for 
breach of an implied contract or the duty of good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
The employment-at-will doctrine allows broad discretion to 
employers to hire and fire for virtually any reason.  The doctrine 
enables both the employer and employee to terminate the employment 
relationship with minimal time and cost.  Viewed literally, it 
presupposes a regime where employers and employees bargain for 
their wage-labor agreement in good faith and with equal bargaining 
power.  Based on this model of employment, separation from 
employment should be an emotionally neutral event.  Yet, neither 
employer nor employee treats the employment relationship as simply 
a bargained-for, wage-labor agreement. 
Studies reveal that most employees do not understand the actual 
discretion that employment at will grants employers.  Instead, 
employees perceive the employment relationship as based upon 
fundamental fairness principles.  The employee’s sense of fairness 
imbues their perception of the employment relationship regardless of 
what the law dictates or the protections actually available. 
The employee’s sense of being treated unfairly—largely due to 
perceived breaches of non-legally recognized expectations—has been 
the subject of significant study in the area of psychological contract 
theory found in human resource research literature.  When an 
employee is discharged, she does not simply refer to the applicable 
law for guidance, but rather perceives the employment separation 
through the lens of fairness or justice.  A feeling of being treated 
unjustly generates a significant negative emotional reaction.  If the 
employee views the employment termination as a violation of 
employer-generated expectations, then the likelihood of employee 
retaliation increases.  This reaction is not something that an employer, 
from the perspective of self-interest, should ignore.  Employee 
retaliation can take the form of theft or sabotage, creation of negative 
reputational effects for the employer, or increased rates of litigation.  
Bad-faith termination also produces a feedback loop that may affect 
the remaining employees’ view of the company.  Some measure of 
equitable treatment by the employer in the discharge of employees is 
not only ethically correct, but is cost-effective from the perspective of 
the employer. 
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This Article presented the findings of an empirical survey of 763 
participants.  Through the use of twelve discharge scenarios, the study 
tested the role of procedural and substantive fairness factors in 
predicting negative employee reactions.  As expected, scenarios 
involving procedural or substantive unfairness were positively 
correlated with increased propensities to retaliate and litigate.  In 
scenarios involving both procedural and substantive unfairness, the 
effect on the propensity to retaliate or to litigate was amplified.  The 
reverse was also true; scenarios involving both procedural and 
substantive fairness reduced rates of retaliation and litigation to nearly 
half of those where both procedural and substantive unfairness factors 
were used.  The study also measured the effects of educating 
employees about the employment-at-will rule on employees’ feelings 
of injustice or violation at the time of termination.  The study found 
that educating employees at the time of hire reduced the rates of 
retaliation and litigation intentions at the time of discharge. 
The study’s findings highlighted the high degree of employee 
sensitivity to perceived unfairness or injustice at the time of 
discharge.  The reason for being terminated, as well as the process by 
which an employee is discharged, influence the employee’s reactions 
to being discharged.  Termination for a fair reason is helpful, as is 
implementing a fair process for termination.  When both are present, 
the rates of retaliation and litigation are substantially reduced.  In 
addition, educating employees in the law of termination diminished 
the rates of retaliation and litigation at the time of termination.  It can 
be conjectured that early disclosure of the lack of employee 
protections dampens the feeling of injustice or violation at the time of 
discharge, thus reducing rates of retaliation and litigation. 
Psychological contract theory can be used to explain the creation of 
the existing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.  
Psychological contract theory also can be used as a guide to 
reforming employment law.  This reformation can be done by a 
wholesale change from the employment-at-will to a just-cause-
termination legal regime.  This, however, is unlikely to happen, and 
the use of existing doctrines, such as promissory estoppel and the tort 
of bad faith, as well as an expansion of the implied-in-fact and duty-
of-good-faith exceptions to employment at will may achieve the same 
goal.  Such reform is not solely for the benefit of employees.  Our 
empirical findings and analysis suggest that such reform will result in 
the merging of the legal employment contract and the psychological 
contract, which will produce benefits for employers and employees. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLES USED IN TWELVE EMPLOYMENT SCENARIOS 
Upon graduating from business school, you accept an offer of 
employment from APEX Corporation.  After accepting APEX’s job 
offer you attended a mandatory orientation for new employees. 
1.  PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS: FAIR AND UNFAIR 
1.1 Procedural Fairness 
Upon receiving the news of your firing, you consulted your 
Employee Manual, which described the procedures governing 
terminations.  The section on “Employee Discharge” noted that each 
employee should be evaluated every six months and should be 
notified of areas that required improvement.  Before an employee can 
be fired, the Manual requires two notices of substandard work and a 
final three-month probationary period.  If, after the probationary 
period, the employee had not improved satisfactorily, then the 
employee is issued a two-week notice of discharge. 
True to the process outlined in the Manual, you received your first 
review at the six-month mark.  That review did indeed include a 
“Notice of Substandard Evaluation.”  The evaluation stated the 
specific reason for the notice and suggested that you seek guidance 
through the human resource department or the organization’s informal 
mentoring program.  You decided to attempt to make the necessary 
changes to improve, but it was more difficult than you had foreseen.  
Thus, your second six-month review again included a “Notice of 
Substandard Evaluation” along with a notice that you would be given 
a three-month probationary period to improve.  The review 
acknowledged some areas of improvement, but the improvement was 
not sufficient.  The review also assigned a more senior member of the 
company to act as a mentor from whom you could seek help.  Despite 
some helpful suggestions and continued effort on your part, little 
changed in the coming months.  As a result, the three-month period 
was followed by a “Two Week Notice of Discharge.”  Thus, the 
procedures laid out in the Employee Manual had been followed 
completely. 
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1.2 Procedural Unfairness 
Upon receiving the news of your firing, you consulted your 
Employee Manual, which described the procedures governing 
terminations.  The section on “Employee Discharge” noted that each 
employee should be evaluated every six months and should be 
notified of areas that required improvement.  Before an employee can 
be fired, the Manual requires two notices of substandard work and a 
final three-month probationary period.  If, after the probationary 
period, the employee had not improved satisfactorily, then the 
employee is issued a two-week notice of discharge. 
Your first six-month evaluation by your new boss was uneventful, 
with your performance being satisfactory in almost all respects.  To 
your surprise, you suddenly received a “Notice of Substandard 
Evaluation” only three weeks later.  This was followed almost 
immediately by a “Two Week Notice of Discharge.”  Thus, the 
procedures laid out in the Employee Manual had not been followed at 
all.  You immediately complained to the Personnel Director, who 
stated that there had been a change in company policy giving 
department heads greater discretion in employee discharges.  The 
director said there was nothing that could be done about your 
termination. 
2. SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS: FAIR (PERFORMANCE) AND UNFAIR 
(OBESITY) 
2.1 Substantive Fairness 
It has now been more than a year since you accepted APEX’s job 
offer and attended the new employee orientation.  The manager who 
hired you was hired by another company soon after your arrival, and 
you have worked under a new manager for a full year. 
Unfortunately, you have been advised that your job performance is 
substandard.  You find the work especially difficult and fall behind 
the performance numbers of most of your coworkers.  You have 
failed to improve your overall performance, though you did get better 
in one or two specific areas.  Despite these efforts, you are fired due 
to poor job performance. 
2.2 Substantive Unfairness 
It has now been more than a year since you accepted APEX’s job 
offer and attended the new employee orientation.  Another company 
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hired the manager who hired you soon after your arrival, and you 
have worked under a new manager for a full year. 
Unfortunately, your new boss complains to you and others in the 
department about the fact that you are overweight.  Your boss 
suggests that your overweight appearance is not the image that the 
department should project.  You failed to lose weight in the months 
following these comments, though you did attempt to improve your 
professional appearance by altering your clothes and other aspects of 
your appearance.  Despite these efforts, you are fired due to being 
overweight. 
3.  LAW CONDITIONS: NON-CUEING, CUEING, AND EDUCATING 
3.1 No Law Cueing 
The new employee orientation was fairly typical for corporations 
of APEX’s size and industry.  Historical information was provided 
about the company, and economic information on the company’s 
performance was reviewed.  This information included market-share 
information, positioning of relevant products vis-à-vis competitors, 
and profitability information for the last several quarters.  Various 
procedures governing compensation, benefits, and discharge policies 
were also discussed, and new employees were given a chance to ask 
questions about such policies. 
3.2 Cueing 
One important aspect of the orientation was a presentation made by 
the company lawyer that discussed the nature of your employment.  
The lawyer noted that the employment relationship is primarily based 
upon the law of contract, where the employer and employee agree to 
the terms of the employment.  An express employment contract is one 
that is in a written form, but most jobs do not actually have an express 
contract.  Instead, the law generally presumes that an employment 
relationship is at will.  This means that the employee may quit at any 
time without notice and the employer may fire the employee at any 
time and without cause (reason). 
Some states, however, have begun to develop two exceptions to the 
employer’s rights to freely fire an at-will employee.  Both of these 
relate to the notion of implied contracts.  First, even when there is no 
express contract providing job security, statements made by the 
company orally or in its documents (policies, procedures, and 
employee handbooks) create a modification of the at-will nature of 
the employment.  This is called an implied-in-fact contract.  
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Therefore, firing an employee in violation of such oral or written 
statements may lead to a charge of “breach of contract.”  Second, 
courts may imply a duty on the employer to “act in good faith” in the 
discharge of an employee.  Therefore, giving an insincere reason for 
firing any employee may lead to a claim of “wrongful discharge.” 
 
3.3 Educating 
One important aspect of the orientation was a presentation made by 
the company lawyer that discussed the nature of your employment.  
The lawyer noted that the employment relationship is primarily based 
upon the law of contract, where the employer and employee agree to 
the terms of the employment.  An express employment contract is one 
that is in a written form, but most jobs do not actually have an express 
contract.  Instead, the law generally presumes that an employment 
relationship is at will.  This means that the employee may quit at any 
time without notice and the employer may fire the employee at any 
time and without cause (reason). 
Some states, however, have begun to develop two exceptions to the 
employer’s rights to freely fire an at-will employee.  Both of these 
relate to the notion of implied contracts.  First, even when there is no 
express contract providing job security, statements made by the 
company orally or in its documents (policies, procedures, employee 
handbooks) create a modification of the at-will nature of the 
employment.  This is called an implied-in-fact contract.  Therefore, 
firing an employee in violation of such oral or written statements may 
lead to a charge of “breach of contract.”  Second, the courts may 
imply a duty on the employer to “act in good faith” in the discharge of 
an employee.  Therefore, giving an insincere reason for firing any 
employee may lead to a charge of “wrongful discharge.” 
The company lawyer went on to say that express provisions in the 
Employee Manual can maintain the legal enforceability of at-will 
relationships despite any assurances of long-term employment.  These 
“express disclaimer clauses” will win out over any policy statements 
in the Employee Manual or statements made by company 
representatives regarding long-term job security.  The lawyer noted 
that the extended process of evaluation and notice in the Employee 
Manual was simply a statement of “current” company policy that was 
subject to change at any time.  Therefore, either you or the company 
may end the employment relationship at any time without cause and 
“for any or no reason.”  The lawyer then referred you to the 
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“disclaimer clause” that appeared on the front cover of the Employee 
Manual in bold letters.  It states that: THIS MANUAL AND THE 
POLICIES CONTAINED WITHIN ARE GIVEN TO YOU FOR 
INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.  NOTHING CONTAINED 
WITHIN THIS MANUAL IS TO BE CONSIDERED BINDING ON 
THE EMPLOYER.  THIS MANUAL DOES NOT REPRESENT A 
CONTRACT AND IS NOT MEANT TO IMPOSE ANY LEGAL 
OBLIGATIONS UPON THE EMPLOYER REGARDING JOB 
SECURITY OR THE PROCESS OF DISCHARGING 
EMPLOYEES.  THE EMPLOYER RETAINS ALL RIGHTS TO 
DISCHARGE YOU AT ANY TIME, FOR ANY REASON, AND 
WITHOUT NOTICE.  THE EMPLOYER MAY AMEND OR 
TERMINATE AT ANY TIME THE POLICIES AND BENEFITS 
DESCRIBED IN THIS MANUAL.  The lawyer concluded by stating 
that such disclaimer clauses are enforced by the courts. 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
(Excerpted) 
LAW & JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE: SURVEY 
Once you’ve completely read the scenario, please answer the 
following questions with the scale provided.  They ask about the facts 
included in the version of the scenario that you read.  Some of these 
facts may have been present in your version, some of the facts may 
not have been.  Please look back at the scenario if you are uncertain 
what to answer. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly Agree 
 
According to the version of the scenario that you read . . . 
(Law Condition Manipulation Check) 
1. APEX’s orientation included a presentation made by the 
company lawyer. 
2. APEX’s orientation included a presentation that discussed at-
will employment issues. 
3. APEX’s orientation discussed something called a “disclaimer 
clause.” 
4. APEX’s Employee Manual includes a “disclaimer clause” on 
the front cover. 
(Substantive Fairness Manipulation Check) 
5. The specific reason given for your firing seemed fair. 
6. The specific reason given for your firing seemed appropriate. 
(Procedural Fairness Manipulation Check) 
7. APEX followed all the necessary procedures when implementing your 
firing. 
8. APEX failed to follow some of the necessary procedures when 
carrying out your firing. 
DIMATTEO 1/31/2012  1:37 PM 
520 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 449 
The following questions ask you about your opinions of APEX, its 
conduct, and the law.  Please answer honestly using the scale 
provided. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly Agree 
 
(Global Fairness Perceptions) 
9. In general, APEX seems like a fair company. 
10. In general, APEX seems to do things fairly. 
11. Overall, I believe APEX is a fair employer. 
(Law and Fairness) 
12. APEX’s conduct violated the law. 
13. APEX’s conduct was legal but unfair. 
14. The current state of the law strikes a fair balance between the interests 
of employers and employees. 
15. The law on employment discharge should be changed to be more 
protective of employees. 
16. Ultimately what is fair in firing employees is what the law recognizes 
as legally sufficient. 
17. The trend in employment discharge law is toward greater protection of 
employees. 
18. The law of employment discharge should change according to 
society’s sense of fairness. 
19. The employment-at-will rule need not be changed because employees 
are free to negotiate better terms of employment. 
20. Most employees do not know or understand the meaning of the 
employment-at-will rule. 
21. Most employees believe that they cannot be fired without a good cause 
or reason. 
22. Most employees believe that it should be illegal for an employer to fire 
an employee without following the rules outlined in the employee 
handbook. 
23. The law needs limits on employment at will because employees do not 
possess the required information to make an informed employment 
decision. 
24. Even when employees are educated as to the employment-at-will 
doctrine, they fail to understand its importance. 
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25. Even when employees understand the employment-at-will doctrine, 
they are powerless to negotiate better terms with a new employer. 
Assume that you were asked to work for two more weeks before officially 
leaving APEX.  You were therefore what is called a “lame duck employee”—
someone who has been fired but must still come into work for some specified 
amount of time.  The questions to follow ask how likely it is that you would 
engage in various behaviors during those last two weeks.  Please answer 
honestly using the scale below. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Very  Unlikely Unlikely Neither Unlikely Likely Very Likely 
     nor Likely  
 
During those last two weeks at APEX, I would: 
(Task Performance) 
26. Adequately complete my assigned duties. 
27. Fulfill the responsibilities specified in my job description. 
28. Perform tasks that are expected of me. 
29. Meet the formal requirements of my job. 
30. Engage in those activities that directly affect my performance. 
31. Neglect aspects of my job that I am obligated to perform. 
32. Fail to perform essential duties. 
(Citizenship Behavior) 
33. Help others who have been absent. 
34. Willingly give my time to help others who have work-related  
problems. 
35. Adjust my work schedule to accommodate other employees’ 
requests for time off. 
36. Go out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in 
the work group. 
37. Show genuine concern and courtesy toward coworkers, even 
under the most trying situations. 
38. Give up time to help others who have work or non-work 
problems. 
39. Assist others with their duties. 
40. Share personal property with others to help them work. 
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41. Attend functions that are not required but that help the 
organizational image. 
42. Keep up with the developments of the organization. 
43. Defend the organization when other employees criticize it. 
44. Show pride when representing the organization in public. 
45. Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization. 
46. Express loyalty toward the organization. 
47. Take action to protect the organization from potential 
problems. 
48. Demonstrate concern about the image of the organization. 
(Withdrawal Behavior) 
49. Think about being absent. 
50. Chat with coworkers about non-work topics on work time. 
51. Leave my workstation for unnecessary reasons. 
52. Daydream during work. 
53. Spend work time on personal matters. 
54. Put less effort into the job. 
55. Think about leaving the job. 
56. Let others do my work. 
57. Leave work early without permission. 
58. Take longer lunch or rest breaks than allowed. 
59. Fall asleep at work. 
(Counterproductive Behavior) 
60. Damage property belonging to my employer. 
61. Say or do something to purposely hurt someone at work. 
62. Do work badly, incorrectly, or slowly on purpose. 
63. Gripe with coworkers. 
64. Deliberately bend or break a rule or rules. 
65. Criticize people at work. 
66. Do something that harms my employer or boss. 
67. Start an argument with someone at work. 
68. Say rude things about my supervisor or organization. 
 
Once you had officially left APEX, would you be tempted to pursue legal 
action against the company?  The questions to follow ask how likely it is that 
you would engage in various courses of legal action against APEX.  Please 
answer honestly using the scale below. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
Very  Unlikely Unlikely Neither Unlikely Likely Very Likely 
     nor Likely  
 
After being fired from APEX, I would: 
(Litigation Intentions) 
69. Pursue legal action against APEX. 
70. Sue APEX for wrongful discharge. 
71. Take APEX to court over my firing. 
72. Sue APEX for unfair discharge, even though it did not do anything 
technically illegal. 
73. Take legal action against APEX, even though no laws were broken. 
 
If I did bring suit against APEX, I would: 
(Settlement Intentions) 
74. Settle before reaching trial if an equitable agreement could be reached. 
75. Settle before reaching a verdict if a fair compromise could be found. 
76. Refuse to settle so APEX could experience the stress of a guilty verdict. 
77. Refuse to let APEX “off the hook” by settling out of court. 
 
After any legal action was concluded, I would: 
(Retaliation Intentions) 
78. Continue to say bad things about APEX to potential clients or 
customers. 
79. Let everyone know that APEX is not a company to be trusted. 
80. Try to steer people away from doing business with APEX. 
81. Discourage friends or family from applying for jobs with APEX. 
 
I would be less likely to pursue legal action or retaliate against APEX if: 
(Employability Security) 
82. I received state-of-the-art training while employed at APEX. 
83. APEX had an industry reputation for educating their employees with 
cutting-edge employment skills. 
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84. Ex-employees of APEX were considered highly marketable in the 
industry because of APEX’s in-house training programs. 
85. APEX was considered an industry leader in innovation and employee 
development. 
 
